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Andreas Jacobs 
Introduction 
There is little doubt that the Barcelona process, after more than eight years 
of existence, is nowhere near its objective of turning the Mediterranean into 
an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity. Efforts undertaken in the 
last three or four years to reform and restart the process have been fruitless. 
Two recent developments further contribute to stagnation in the Mediterra-
nean:  
First, the enlargement of the European Union to the East has substantially 
absorbed European attention and resources alike. With the accession of 
several Eastern-European states the geopolitical weight within the EU is 
likely to be moved towards East and North. In any case, the voting power 
of the “Mediterranean Block” will be reduced, and its influence is likely to 
get seriously diluted. Therefore, many southern partners argue that the en-
larged EU will have difficulties in maintaining a balanced policy in the 
Middle East and in giving fair attention to mediterranean concerns.  
Second, the war and the ongoing crisis in Iraq have profoundly influenced 
the Mediterranean security environment and the outlook for inter-regional 
dialogue in a negative way. After the Iraq War it seems that giving new 
impetus to the Barcelona process is more difficult than ever. To the extent 
that the Middle East and the Persion Gulf will become the focus of increas-
ing American and European attention in political, security and economic 
terms, it will raise important questions about the continued viability of the 
Mediterranean as a strategic space, as well as the utility of “Mediterranean” 
initiatives. However, the Iraq crisis has underscored the potential utility of 
North-South dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean. But it has also 
significantly complicated the prospects for cooperation outside a bilateral 
framework.  
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By and large, the post-Iraq/pre-enlargement climate is not conducive to 
smooth dialogue between North and South in the Mediterranean. To make 
sure that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will survive and will further-
more gain new vigour, several questions have to be adressed: Is the Barce-
lona process the correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of politi-
cal, economic, and cultural security challenges largely emanating along 
Europe’s southern periphery? What measures can be introduced to make 
this process more effective and sustainable than it has been in the past? 
What are the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and 
what relevant role can the Barcelona process play?  
This Discussion Paper contains interventions and statements made during 
the conference “Euro-Mediterranean partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis” 
organised by the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) on October 
14 and 15, 2003 in Bonn. This IV. Mediterranean Forum was part of a lar-
ger project of cooperation dealing with the future of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations organized by ZEI and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in coop-
eration with the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission EuroMesco. The 
intention of both institutions is to intensify the dialogue between academics 
and politicians from both sides of the Mediterranean in order to create 
some form of collective identity which – in the long run – may help to ease 
existing differences and misperceptions. 
Both institutions are grateful to the Thyssen Foundation for their generous 
financial support to this project and its documentation. 
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H.E. President Guido de Marco 
The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Rela-
tions: the Vision of Malta
* 
I want to thank Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt and the Center for European 
Integration Studies for having invited me here today at the University of 
Bonn to speak about the relations between the Mediterranean and Europe, 
to explore together some thoughts about this fascinating sea that can be 
both a divide and a bridge; a sea which lives a quandary, as if caught in a 
“cul-de-sac” wherein a way out seems difficult - sometimes even impossi-
ble; a sea shared by so many countries and yet to each other they can be 
complete strangers; a sea in common to many peoples caught in the gravi-
tational orbit of mistrust, of extreme passions, of deep mutual miscompre-
hension. I am delighted to be here today for several reasons. 
First the relations between Europe and the Mediterranean have always in-
trigued me: they have always been central to my thoughts and to my politi-
cal activities. 
Secondly, having forged throughout the years, very good relations with, 
and enjoying the trust of our southern neighbors, there is a “moral” expec-
tation for Malta as a Member State of the European Union to push upwards 
the Mediterranean agenda of European affairs, a meaningful debate on 
Mediterranean issues, issues that are of concern to both Europeans and the 
Arab world but that have consistently failed to attract their due attention. 
Thirdly, the Mediterranean, though an important destination for tourists 
from Europe, for many in the North, may feel to be distant from the epicen-
ter of world affairs. It is often the case for our region to be completely 
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shadowed by developments in other parts of the world even though they 
would be intractably linked with, and sometimes even influenced by, Medi-
terranean issues. It is therefore, for me of particular pleasure to note ZEI’s 
interest in having a chair on our Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic 
Studies at the University of Malta.  
It is not possible to see through the misty screen that sometimes may ap-
pear to dome the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean and 
hence, to glimpse where they are heading to, unless one understands what 
the Mediterranean is. For the French historian Fernand Braudel the Medi-
terranean is: “…a thousand things together. It is not one landscape, but 
numerous landscapes, it is not one sea but complex of seas. It is not one 
civilization, but a number of civilizations, piled one above the other…” 
It is indeed difficult to conceptualise a definition, for the Mediterranean is 
not confined to geography and it goes far beyond history. The Mediterra-
nean is a melting pot of cultures, of values; it is an intersection of three 
continents, of Africa, Asia, and Europe brought together; it is the birthplace 
of the three great monolithic creeds. The Mediterranean is the synonyme 
for crossroads of civilizations. Speaking of his frustration to capture the 
true Mediterranean feeling in his art, the genius enigmatic painter that Vin-
cent Van Gogh was came out with what could possibly be the best defini-
tion of this Sea: “The Mediterranean has the color of mackerel, changeable 
I mean. You don't always know if it is green or violet, you can't even say 
it's blue, because the next moment the changing reflection has taken on a 
tint of rose or grey.” And this I believe is the real value of the Mediterra-
nean: in its diversity is its wealth. It is from this perspective that the future 
of Euro-Mediterranean relations should be examined.  
My country, a small island, just twenty minutes by air from Catania in Sic-
ily, and seventy minutes from Tunis and Rome, reflects this beauty of di-
versity that the Mediterranean embraces: Malta is a microcosm of the 
Mediterranean. Indeed everything about us Maltese reflect our Mediterra-
nean-“ism”. Our language for example, is Semitic in origin, has most of its 
vocabulary from Romance languages, employs European alphabet and its 
syntax is Latin; our architecture is beautiful intricate Baroque with Arab 
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nuances; then there is our innate admiration for the blue sea that surrounds 
us, coupled with our permanent urge to explore beyond our shores, to travel 
the winds. This has been our existence, our way of life. We lived from this 
sea, traded with our neighbours, we fought in these waters, we even pirated 
here. Today the Mediterranean is for us an important source of foreign 
revenue: tourism.  
It is no wonder therefore that Malta follows events in the Mediterranean 
from close and with great interest: we have long realized that that our pros-
perity, our very own survival depends on the stability of the Mediterranean. 
This “concern” pushed Malta in 1972 to advance a theorem in the CSCE 
that there can be no security in Europe unless there is security in the Medi-
terranean and that there can be no security in the Mediterranean unless 
there is security in Europe. This became the Mediterranean basket of Hel-
sinki I. 
More recently in 1995, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, I advanced the idea, during the Final Conference of the Pact on 
Stability in Europe in Paris, of a Charter of Stability for the Mediterranean. 
This concept was a few months later further advanced during the Barcelona 
Conference. The Charter is still under consideration of the Ministerial 
Meetings. It may eventually prove to be the cornerstone of relations be-
tween the countries rimming the Mediterranean. 
With this in mind, as Malta becomes a European Member State on the 1
st of 
May 2004, I cannot avoid remembering the statement made Mr. Jacques 
Delors in 1992 when, then the President of the European Commission: 
“There is a country one forgets, but which is very important as a symbol: 
Malta. We must not displace Europe too much to the North while forgetting 
the South, we would risk losing our sensitivity to the Mediterranean world, 
which is our world, but at present emulates the dangers for the future of all 
of us.” 
Malta as a neo-European Union Member State, will be in a better position 
to ensure the proper evaluation and understanding of the Mediterranean 
world in European affairs and vice-versa. We in Europe are making head-
way in our quest to make of diversity a unity, a splendid mosaic of cultures; 
10   The Vision of Malta 
to make of our past divisions, a reason for working together, a soul and a 
conscience; to make of frontiers, signposts bringing us ever so closer to-
gether where we all feel at home.  
But as the post-war-dream of a united Europe becomes a reality, as the un-
folding of our “maison commune” takes shape and place, as our Europe 
becomes stronger and more prosperous, we must start acting decisively on 
the regions closest to us. And this not only because we may foresee threats 
but also because of those intrinsic values that make Europe so unique and 
so different from other powers; of our continent’s age-old vocation to be 
outward looking, to be an inspiration in the world that encourages peoples 
to have their chance to take hold of their destiny. In this respect, a clear and 
committed policy for the Mediterranean is but an obligation: to neglect the 
cradle that nursed Europe is to abandon the roots of Europe. 
In my view, the European Union has to have a deeper insight and a better 
understanding of the Mediterranean, if it has to have a meaningful role in 
the region. Some may ask, why have a meaningful role? Some may suggest 
that the best way how to deal with Mediterranean issues should be on the 
vertical. This would bring individual European states, Members of the Un-
ion, having their own arrangements and contacts with the states of the 
southern rim of the Mediterranean, strengthening thereby their ties, politi-
cal and commercial, through bilateral relations.  
There is nothing wrong or politically incorrect for individual member states 
to foster the bilateral relations through the vertical approach; with this im-
portant reservation, it would underline the non effectiveness of the Euro-
pean Union to add its political weight to solutions. This would amount to 
considering the Mediterranean in a state of affairs without a vision to solve 
its problems. Our experience has shown that vertical relations alone fail in 
providing solutions to issues which are becoming a growing threat to peace 
and security, not only within the Mediterranean but also beyond it. 
At the core of the Mediterranean explosive situation is the Israeli-
Palestinian issue. This festering wound has been poisoning relations be-
tween the Arab world and the so called western world. For the Arab peo-
ples consider that the constant humiliation inflicted on the Palestinians, the 
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futility of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, in particular 242 
and 338, have rendered European countries silent and at times, albeit, un-
willing accomplices in protracting the state of affairs whereby the inalien-
able rights of the Palestinian people are being denied.  
Terrorism is a major threat to civilization itself; but it is a grave mistake to 
use terrorism as a justification for the military occupation of Palestinian 
territory, for the existence and continued expansion of Jewish settlements 
on Arab land, on the building of a wall conveniently placed as to grab even 
more land and render the Palestinians not only refugees in their own coun-
try but also prisoners in their own country. 
Two weeks ago I participated at the 80
th birthday celebrations of a great 
statesman, Shimon Peres, a celebration which was also attended by Presi-
dent Rau amongst others. In the open discussions held, Shimon Peres made 
abundantly clear that there can be no future for a democratic Jewish state 
unless two states, Palestine and Israel, are made to live side by side. And 
may I add that isolating Arafat, and putting the sole blame for the failure of 
the Road Map on Palestinian terrorism without censoring the spiral of vio-
lence on both sides and the persistent settlement policy is to my view a non 
realistic approach to bringing the issue closer to a solution. Only last Fri-
day, 9
th of October, in his briefing to the European Parliament on the Mid-
dle East crisis, Dr. Javier Solana, the High Representative of the European 
Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy admitted that he is 
overcome by frustration: “… Frustration because the Middle East is con-
tinuing to bleed to death, with a never-ending trickle of lost lives. Frustra-
tion because the Israelis and Palestinians have not been able, or have not 
wanted, to implement the commitments so formally entered into in Aqaba 
only a few weeks ago. Frustration because tension in the region has again 
reached extremely worrying levels. Frustration because ever fewer people 
believe in the Road Map instigated by the Quartet. Finally frustration be-
cause the despair which has already taken hold of so many Arabs and Is-
raelis may become established among us, the politicians and among citi-
zens.” 
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It is here indeed that the European Union can provide its determined weight 
against a crisis in frustration which in its process of escalation may enve-
lope the whole Mediterranean region and beyond. Malta’s insistence at 
Helsinki in the early seventies that there can be no security in Europe with-
out security in the Mediterranean, becomes even more relevant today. 
As already mentioned, Malta’s vision of the Mediterranean envisages a 
Charter of Stability for the region. As was stated in the “Reflections on a 
Stability Pact for the Mediterranean” communicated by Malta in 1996 to 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of countries participating in the Euro-Med 
process: “The proposal of a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean is based 
upon a shared awareness that there exists in the Mediterranean a number of 
identifiable factors arising from the historical, cultural in geo-political con-
figuration of the region itself, which constitute actual or political causes of 
friction and tension among regional states.” 
I have described the Mediterranean as a bomb with an ever shortening fuse. 
A Council for the Mediterranean, perhaps, may provide the parameters es-
sential to giving the Mediterranean the framework leading to a solution just 
as, perhaps, the creation of a Council of Europe in the immediate post war, 
served as foundation of the European Union. We believe that the Mediter-
ranean faces an option: either keeping the Mediterranean as a great divide, 
bordering the sea with security organizations, or providing the necessary 
mechanisms on the horizontal aimed at enhancing the stability of the Medi-
terranean. Most peoples and most governments on both sides of this sea, 
have come to the conclusion that Europe needs the Mediterranean and that 
the Mediterranean needs Europe.  
In order to give this reciprocal need political visibility, we have to ensure a 
greater relevance to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership involving the three 
pillars of the Barcelona process: political dialogue and security, economic 
and financial partnership, social and cultural cooperation. I do not think 
that this can be achieved through a one-way traffic. Countries on the south-
ern part of the Mediterranean have also to shoulder their responsibilities 
and ensuring, for an economic and financial partnership to evolve, the right 
political and juridical environment.  
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In the Barcelona Process, the social and cultural pillar is of the utmost im-
portance. This can be best achieved through a stronger people to people 
approach. The Universities and academies in the Mediterranean have a ma-
jor role to play, to ensure the social and cultural cooperation, the cross fer-
tilization of ideas, the eventual setting up of a University of the Mediterra-
nean, possibly with campuses in more than one Mediterranean country, 
with emphasis on Mediterranean studies. This will certainly help in creat-
ing a Euro-Med “forma mentis” which in time, will evolve in a correct in-
teraction between the peoples of this sea.  
For many in Europe, the Mediterranean may be a far-off sea, with a great 
magnet call for tourism. It is that too, but much more. For those who stud-
ied Roman history, the “Pax Romana” can be seen in the Mediterranean 
through Sabrata Leptis Magna in Libya, through Jerash in Jordan, the am-
phitheater at Aspendos in Turkey, the temples of Agrigento in Sicily, the 
Colosseum in Lyon and the Roman ruins in Seville. The “Pax Romana” 
was built on the three pillars, political, economic and social unity of the 
Mediterranean making of it a “mare nostrum”. For the present and for the 
future, many of the elements mentioned have to be recreated and this is 
precisely what we are trying to do, so far without success with the Barce-
lona Process and its three pillars. Prof. Pedig Madvejevic, a scholar of 
Mediterranean affairs once observed that in the Mediterranean there exists 
a “strong identity in being” but which is not corresponded by an “equal 
identity in doing”. What we are trying to stimulate is this identity in doing. 
Indeed what we lack in the Mediterranean and for the Mediterranean are 
not plans and proposals. What we lack is the political will. We in Malta 
believe that the European Union through its political will and through its 
policies which are the result of dialogue and cooperation with the other ri-
parian states can succeed in building a “Pax Mediterranea”, which will be 
of the essence for the future, a guarantee of prosperity, a builder of bridges 
between Europe and the Mediterranean. 
For the European Union, to be able to forge stronger regional relations, not 
only in the Mediterranean but elsewhere it has to emerge as a more influen-
tial world actor. To do this it has to rise to the challenge of a Common For-
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eign and Security Policy; it has to speak a voice in unity, a strong voice that 
will benefit the emergence of a multi-polar world-order for as Sir Winston 
Churchill said fifty years ago: “The safety of the world requires a new unity 
in Europe” 
The inability of Europe to speak with one voice and to act in unison, on the 
outset of the Iraqi crisis is a crude reminder of the long way Europe has to 
become a world leader in security issues. We, in Europe, have made out of 
our cultures a treasure, we have built a common home: we have remained 
Maltese, Germans, French, English but through our common heritage and a 
determined political will, we are also Europeans. To my view, the future of 
Euro-Mediterranean relations lies in addressing the problems that are hin-
dering this region from continuing its evolution, the problems that are im-
peding us to see eye to eye. Only then, when we make way for develop-
ment can a meaningful intercultural dialogue happen between the northern 
and the southern coasts of the Mediterranean. 
It is a blunder, perhaps paranoia, to mistake frustration, poverty and injus-
tice for a “Clash of Civilisations”. For those who beget self fulfilling 
prophecies of a clash of civilizations, are not realizing that this clash will 
be most negative inheritance that we can pass on to our children. For pride 
and prejudice, are no substitutes to dialogue and understanding. The conse-
quences of a mistaken stand to the Mediterranean will be of serious conse-
quence to all. The immediate impact will certainly be felt by those who are 
and belong to the region. But it will not be limited to them. Malta’s pro-
active Mediterranean policy can only have relevance if it is sustained by 
others, who like us believe that Europe needs the Mediterranean and that 
the Mediterranean needs Europe. 
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Stephen C. Calleya/ Eberhard Rhein 
The Euro-Med Partnership needs a 
strong push 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is certainly the most important 
regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean as it brings to-
gether all of the European Union (EU) member states and twelve Mediter-
ranean countries which are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Is-
rael, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta. 
(Cyprus and Malta are due to become members of the EU in May 2004, 
thus reducing the number of Mediterranean partner countries to ten). 
In the past decade the EMP has certainly strengthened north-south relations 
between the EU and the Mediterranean. The sheer amount of meetings and 
policy actions that have been launched since 1995 has resulted in the crea-
tion of an intricate web of political, academic and civil societal networks 
emerging that are all contributing to a more intensive north-south pattern of 
relations in this part of the world. In contrast the EMP has only recently 
succeeded in spurring south-south relations in the Mediterranean despite 
the high priority that has been given to this objective since the start of the 
EMP.  
The EU has consistently focused on assisting Mediterranean countries be-
come more aware of the opportunities that exist in their neighbouring 
states, and offering the Mediterranean countries involved in the EMP in-
centive packages to pursue trans-Mediterranean ventures. The EMP has 
also ensured that the EU’s focus on enhancing relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe over the past decade is complemented by an outreach pro-
gramme towards the Mediterranean that seeks to advance co-operative rela-
tions in the area. 
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As the Barcelona Process approaches its tenth anniversary, Euro-
Mediterranean policy makers need to think about measures that will help 
transform this multilateral initiative from a boundary management exercise 
to a process that focuses more on encouraging boundary transformation. 
Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are in the pipeline and include the en-
hanced political dialogue, the Charter for Peace and Stability, the creation 
of a free trade area, and justice and home affairs co-operation must seek to 
achieve more than maintenance of stable Euro-Mediterranean relations.  
If the EU wants to develop a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that is sus-
tainable it should introduce a series of measures that will allow and enable 
Mediterranean states to integrate into the international political economy 
that dominates global relations. The EU’s southern borderlands must also 
realise that the only policies that will improve their political and economic 
outlook are those that are home-grown and implemented. If the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy towards the south is to be successful it must work 
closely with local reformers and not try to export modalities of reform that 
have been devised somewhere else.  
Given such a heterogeneous cluster of regional dynamics, is the EMP the 
correct mechanism to contend with the plethora of political, economic, and 
cultural security challenges largely emanating along Europe’s southern pe-
riphery? What measures can be introduced to make this process more effec-
tive and sustainable than it has during it first decade of operation? What are 
the prospects for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean area and what rele-
vant role can the EMP play in this future?  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Political, Eco-
nomic and Cultural Relations  
At the first Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting which took 
place in Barcelona in November 1995, the twenty-seven partner countries 
established three principal areas of co-operation. The Barcelona Process set 
out three basic tasks: a political and security partnership with the aim of 
establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and finan-
cial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; and a 
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partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote un-
derstanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. 
When it comes to the direct tangible endeavours that the Euro-
Mediterranean process should seek to realise it is crucial to ask again and 
again what will determine the success of the over-arching Barcelona proc-
ess? It will essentially be the Mediterranean countries’ ability to generate 
higher rates of growth than they achieved during the 1980s and 1990s. In 
an effort to shore up its external policy towards the Mediterranean the EU 
adopted a Common Strategy at the Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council 
which brought to a conclusion the Portuguese Presidency of the EU at the 
end of June 2000. The EU’s common strategy highlighted the fact that im-
provement in Euro-Mediterranean relations was dependant on the Mediter-
ranean partner countries playing a more decisive role during the implemen-
tation stage of projects agreed upon.  
The Common Strategy also called for the active participation of the Medi-
terranean countries when it comes to defining a co-operative Euro-Med 
agenda as it is in the interest of Mediterranean states to draw up a list of 
meaningful actions. The common strategy actually invites them to do this: 
“the EU is bound to consider recommendations and concerns expressed by 
Mediterranean partners”. This specific invitation to Mediterranean states to 
adopt more of a self-help attitude in their interactions with the EU contrasts 
sharply with the approach to Euro-Mediterranean policy making in previ-
ous decades when the EU would more or less dictate the terms upon which 
co-operative ventures could take place.  
The cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean security partnership is the en-
visaged Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. This docu-
ment would serve as the framework within which Euro-Mediterranean se-
curity relations could be managed in the twenty-first century. A first 
glimpse of what the Charter for Peace and Stability could include was pre-
sented at the Third Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting at 
Stuttgart in April 1999. The Charter is to be a politically binding and not 
legally binding document. The rule of consensus is to be applicable to all 
decisions, joint actions, measures and mechanisms. The Charter is to rec-
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ognise the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Med sphere and beyond and 
to acknowledge the concept of comprehensive security. There is to be no 
interference in the settlement of current conflicts. 
The Charter would serve as a functional instrument for the implementation 
of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration. The establishment of an en-
hanced political dialogue is to remain a priority. Once the Charter was 
agreed upon, more of an effort could be dedicated to partnership building 
measures, good neighbourly relations, sub-regional co-operation and pre-
ventive diplomacy in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The lack of consensus 
that has emerged in recent years when it comes to agreeing upon a Charter 
for Peace and Stability dictates that Euro-Med states should focus on 
strengthening existing pragmatic partnership building measures (PBM’s) as 
a precursor to a more sustainable multilateral initiative in future. PBM’s 
will also assist in fostering a Euro-Mediterranean security culture in which 
the concepts of early warning and conflict prevention become operational. 
In the economic sector, by about 2010, the EU will have become by far the 
biggest single market and the world’s most concentrated area of economic 
prosperity and internal stability. It will comprise essentially all of Europe, 
east and west, more than 90 percent of total European population. i.e. al-
most 500 million people, (half of China or India) and have a combined 
GDP of some 12 000 billion US-Dollar, an almost unimaginable figure. 
How will the non-EU riparian Mediterranean countries, from Turkey to 
Morocco, adapt to these profound geopolitical changes that will take place 
north of them in the next 12 years? How will they coexist with the future 
European giant? To what extent will they be drawn into its economic and 
political orbit? To what extent will they have to integrate with the Euro-
pean and consequently the world economy? These are questions of vital 
importance for both the EU and each of its Mediterranean neighbours. 
A key question to ask is what will determine whether the Barcelona Proc-
ess is ultimately a success or not? If economic prospects are to improve in 
the Mediterranean area the Barcelona Process must provide a stable politi-
cal and security environment by reducing existing tensions and establishing 
a co-operative zone of security. This includes helping to improve social, 
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cultural and human affairs across the Euro-Mediterranean area. The Medi-
terranean epitomises many of the problems associated with the North-South 
debate. These include migration, terrorism, religious intolerance and the 
lack of human rights. Nurturing co-operative cross-cultural patterns of in-
teraction which address these issues is a prerequisite to improving eco-
nomic disparities and ethnic divisions in the area. 
Three areas where the Barcelona Process is already starting to contribute 
are education, human rights and women’s rights. Despite limited actions in 
each of the three areas, each area remains underdeveloped. A programme 
of activities that increases awareness of existing trends in each area and 
also seeks to further discussion on Euro-Mediterranean differences of opin-
ion is essential if a social, cultural and human partnership worthy of such a 
name is to become a reality. The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Founda-
tion offers this possibility.  
The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area will also impact on 
the environment. The free trade area is likely to have a detrimental impact 
as the agricultural sector is forced to adopt more environmentally un-
friendly practices of production in order to remain competitive. Specific 
sectors such as that of water and desertification will require immediate at-
tention and environmental issues should be more directly addressed in the 
Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. When one explores the reper-
cussions that a free trade area will have on the question of human rights, 
one should focus on whether European and Mediterranean interpretations 
of such a complex issue as human rights can ever be harmonised? Human 
rights activists also have to concentrate their attention on such basic eco-
nomic and social rights as the right to work, healthcare, education, civil 
protection, tolerance, and the elimination of discrimination. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Twenty-First 
Century  
Throughout its more than thirty years of direct engagement in the Mediter-
ranean the European Union has failed to contain, let alone reverse, eco-
nomic disparities between the northern and southern countries of the basin. 
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It is also quite clear that little progress has been registered in removing the 
misperceptions and prejudice that currently exist in the region or in promot-
ing further the principles of respect and understanding. A concerted effort 
in implementing specific goals in each of the three chapters of the Barce-
lona Declaration is certainly the most effective way to start tackling such 
problems. 
A conceptual re-think is thus necessary if the process of political, economic 
and cultural adaptation in the Euro-Mediterranean area is to be a successful 
one. The process and progress need to be carefully monitored. The question 
of the social impact of the implementation of a free trade area is not a ques-
tion of lessons and clichés, but of developing realistic policies to cope with 
the changes being introduced. The benefits of the establishment of a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area need to be better explained and maximised if 
the citizens of the Mediterranean area are expected to support this initia-
tive. The name of the Euro-Mediterranean game is that of policy change – 
MEDA I and MEDA II, the financial facilities of the Barcelona Process 
during its first ten years of operation are vehicles of such a change. While 
the EU is seeking to boost political, economic and financial activity across 
the Mediterranean through the Barcelona Process a basic message that has 
yet to resonate across the Mediterranean is that it is up to the countries of 
the area themselves to take the necessary steps to increase economic pros-
perity.  
It has taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a compre-
hensive Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide 
the foundation upon which a “Pax Euro-Mediterranea” is to be established 
over the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focus on spreading pros-
perity’s benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediter-
ranean must not become a wall of poverty along the EU’s southern periph-
ery. This is the Barcelona Process’ ultimate challenge. 
Regional relations in Europe and the Mediterranean since the launching of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Process in November 1995 have underlined the 
fundamental fact that this geo-strategic area continues to be dominated by a 
mosaic of distinct sub-regional constellations, each evolving according to 
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their own indigenous pattern of relations. Although geographically proxi-
mate, developments within Europe and the Mediterranean resemble those 
of a tale of two different worlds. At a time when the European Union has 
been harmonising its policies and strengthening its common interests 
through a process of integration and enlargement, the Mediterranean world 
continues to be characterised by both limited co-operative and continuous 
conflictual patterns of relations that have prevented the emergence of a 
trans-Mediterranean security arrangement.  
To the north of the Mediterranean the EU has been advancing at great 
strides in its effort to prepare for the challenges of globalisation. This in-
cludes furthering EMU, “e-Europe”, deregulation, fiscal stability, and 
company mergers, in an effort to strengthen high economic growth. As a 
consequence the technology and prosperity gap between the EU and the 
Mediterranean has been widening in recent years. It is also important to 
underline that geographic proximity is about the only factor that still brings 
Europe and the Mediterranean closely together at the start of the new mil-
lennium. This is evident when one compares the EU’s economic clout to 
that of the Mediterranean countries. The combined gross domestic product 
of Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean partner countries and 
former Soviet Union is equivalent to that of Italy, with 10 times fewer peo-
ple.
1 The EU is therefore the rich core and the Mediterranean the poor pe-
riphery.  
The EU remains by far the most important economic partner of the Medi-
terranean countries, while individual states to the south account for only 
small percentages of the EU’s external trade. Even when taken together 
they account for about 15 percent of the EU’s total exports and imports. 
This imbalance is mainly due to the difference in national incomes between 
the rich EU and its poor neighbouring countries. Since the launching of the 
Barcelona Process the differences in economic restructuring within the 
Mediterranean between the front-runners such as Cyprus, Malta, Israel and 
 
1  See Dauderstädt, Michael, (1997), "The EU and its poor neighbours: how the cen-
tres could help those on their periphery", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 5. 
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Turkey and the rest of the slow reformers has also been growing. Cyprus 
and Malta are EU accession countries and will join the EU in May 2004.  
Turkey has completed its customs union with the EU after a thirty-year 
transition period. It is now accelerating its economic and political reforms 
as part of its preparations to join the EU some time after 2010. Israel has 
enormously strengthened its links with Europe despite setbacks to a perma-
nent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the years to come it is 
likely to further intensify its economic, cultural and political ties with 
Europe and to turn increasingly into something like a “pseudo-member” of 
the EU. The countries that have concluded Association Agreements with 
the EU, namely Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon and 
the Palestinian Authority are likely to move ahead of Syria in terms of eco-
nomic and, though more slowly, political reforms. Morocco, Tunisia and 
Jordan remain pace-setters within this grouping.  
The large gap in development trends in the adjacent regions of the EU is 
clear when one compares the eastern borderlands of the EU to those of the 
south. In recent years, EU accession countries have economically outpaced 
those in the Mediterranean. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have 
made a remarkable transition towards democracy and a market economy. 
They have been much more successful in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment and portfolio capital and therefore substantially increasing the stan-
dard of living of their people than Mediterranean countries. Their trade 
with the EU has been growing at a much faster rate than that of the Medi-
terranean states.  
While such divergent development indicators give rise to concern, they are 
actually to be expected. Societies rarely move at the same pace. Nor do 
they respond with the same speed to external challenges. Yet the current 
pace of transition will result in a Mediterranean that is falling further be-
hind the EU. The differentiation between accession and Mediterranean 
Partner countries is also better understood when one takes into considera-
tion the following facts. The accession countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe dispose of a much better human resources basis. The prospect of 
EU membership constitutes a far more powerful leverage for economic and 
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political reforms than the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The EU’s finan-
cial support per capita for the accession countries is about six times higher 
than for the Mediterranean partner countries.  
Often espoused as an EU programme for its southern flank to parallel its 
policies with neighbours to the east, the EMP does not offer the same in-
centive of EU membership to the majority of its Mediterranean partners. 
This calls into question the coherence of the economic logic underlying the 
EMP. While Eastern Europeans can expect ultimately that the free move-
ment of labour (people) will coexist with the free movement of goods and 
capital between them and the rest of Europe, this is not the case in the 
Mediterranean. The absence of the free movement of people in the case of 
the EMP stresses the major difference between EU membership and EU 
partnership.
2 
Close to a decade into the Barcelona Process, Mediterranean countries con-
tinue to attract less than two percent of international investment. This is 
mainly due to the region’s profile as a high-risk zone when it comes to po-
litical stability. It is also due to the fact that the Mediterranean market re-
mains partitioned in a multitude of small markets. The entire Maghreb 
market corresponds only to the size of the internal Portuguese market. In-
ternal transaction costs remain very high. The cost for shipping a container 
from Tunisia to Marseilles is higher than the cost for the same container 
between Marseille and Asia.
3 
In recent years the EU has launched a Balkan stability pact and pro-
grammes that seek closer co-operation between the EU and Latin America 
and Asia. In 2003 it also launched its “Neighbourhood Policy” that aims at 
providing a coherent framework within which relations with the EU’s im-
mediate neighbours can be formulatedin the years to come. As the EU be-
comes more engrossed in implementation of its enlargement strategy and 
 
2  See Hollis, Rosemary, “Barcelona’s First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Secu-
rity Relations?”, in Behrendt, Sven and Hanelt, Christian-Peter, (eds.), Bound to 
Co-operate – Europe and the Middle East, Bertelsmann Foundation Publications, 
2001, p.114. 
3  Patten, Chris, “The European Union’s External Policy and the Mediterranean”, 
MEDA Team Information, Issue No. 8, 1 April 2000. 
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its neighbourhood policy there is a risk that the priority once given to the 
Mediterranean could somewhat diminish. If such a risk is not to become a 
reality the Mediterranean countries must actively seek to engage the EU in 
political, economic and cultural policies that promote closer Euro-
Mediterranean relations.  
The time has now come for the Barcelona process to move beyond the talk-
ing and thinking stage and concentrate on delivering tangible results that 
everyone can see and benefit from. Euro-Mediterranean initiatives that are 
in the pipeline and include the enhanced political dialogue, the Charter for 
peace and stability, the creation of a free trade area, and justice and home 
affairs co-operation must become more visible to the public at large and 
seek to foster a durable Euro-Mediterranean partnership. If the EU and its 
Mediterranean partners want to develop a Euro-Mediterranean process that 
is sustainable they should introduce a series of measures that will enable 
them to work together in the trillion Euros a day international political 
economy that has emerged. The EU’s southern borderlands must also real-
ise that the alternative to regional and international integration is economic 
recession and severe socio-economic difficulties. The only way to improve 
their political and economic outlook is for Mediterranean states to adapt 
home-grown reform polices to the realities of the global market.  
Trade statistics illustrate that this is not happening. Intra-regional Mediter-
ranean trade remains stagnant. South-south co-operation is dormant with 
intra-regional trade in the Maghreb representing 5 percent of their total 
trade. Statistics concerning intra-regional trade in the Mashreq is slightly 
more favourable at about 7 percent. The conflict in the Middle East natu-
rally disrupts such co-operation faster than a flick of the switch.  
One approach that may facilitate the task that the EU and Mediterranean 
countries face when it comes to upgrading the economic profile of the 
Mediterranean area is to focus on the promotion of sub regionalism. This 
exercise must result in the opening of sub-regional markets and the creation 
of sub-regional free trade areas within the Mediterranean. Trade liberalisa-
tion within the Euro-Mediterranean process has so far been taking place on 
a north-south basis. It is essential that the EU and its Mediterranean part-
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ners now focus their attention to opening transnational co-operation at a 
south-south level. When it comes to the direct tangible endeavours that the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process should seek to realise it is crucial 
to ask again and again what will determine the success of the over-arching 
Barcelona process? What policy approaches will facilitate implementation 
of the ambitious Barcelona Declaration of November 1995?  
As the EU enlarges and relations across the Mediterranean continue to 
evolve at different speeds and in different directions should the EU con-
sider concentrating more of its political and economic resources at the sub- 
regional level of Mediterranean relations? What instruments and mecha-
nisms will boost the Mediterranean countries’ ability to generate higher 
rates of growth than they achieved during the 1980s and 1990s? The Barce-
lona Process agenda beyond 2005 must seek to address the above issues in 
a direct manner if the EMP is to remain a relevant multilateral forum in the 
decade ahead.  
The Barcelona Process Needs A Strong Push 
Almost a decade has passed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration 
in November 1995, when the Foreign Ministers of the EU and their col-
leagues from all the countries around the Mediterranean pledged to pro-
gressively establish a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, stability and pros-
perity at the horizon of 2010. Since then we have seen profoundly asym-
metrical developments in the EU and the Mediterranean: an EU frantically 
struggling to keep up with the constraints of globalisation, a Mediterranean 
falling further behind. 
The EU has been moving into new areas. It has undertaken two major con-
stitutional reforms, the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties. It has success-
fully introduced a common currency, the Euro. It has virtually completed 
its single market for goods, services, capital and people. It has started to 
develop a common security machinery to be ready for action by 2003. It 
has made great strides towards a common area of law and security. The EU 
has also set itself the objective to become a knowledge society and a com-
mon area of research and science by 2010. It has readied itself for the 5
th 
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enlargement: by 2004 10 new member countries from central Europe and 
the Mediterranean are expected to join the EU, after having undergone, 
during the last 10 years, a thorough transformation process of their eco-
nomic, social and political systems.  
During the same period, most of the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries 
have moved ahead very slowly. The prosperity gap with Europe, especially 
Central European countries, has further widened. It would have widened 
even further without the general rise of oil prices and a significant slow-
down of demographic growth, the only positive developments in the re-
gion. There has been no attempt whatever towards more economic, let 
alone political integration. The Maghreb has not advanced a bit towards 
closer cooperation, contrary to what had been called for by the 1989 Treaty 
on the Maghreb Union. Throughout the Mediterranean area, the reform 
process has been lamentably slow. Privatisation and deregulation of the 
economies are still in the very beginning. Hardly any country has made 
convincing strides on the path towards political accountability and democ-
racy. 
The EU’s Mediterranean policy aims at profound economic, social and po-
litical reforms in the southern neighbour countries. Free trade and EU assis-
tance are only instruments to that end. Yet the work of reform cannot be 
done by the EU alone. It has to be done by the Mediterranean countries 
themselves, their societies and above all the political elites. To that end, 
they have to realise that such reforms are in their long-term interest, in 
view of spreading education, more prosperity, better health, more political 
stability and less social tension and unrest. Such awareness is largely lack-
ing on the part of the political elites. They are not prepared to abandon their 
privileged position to the market forces, to share power with other social 
forces, for example, the emerging entrepreneurial class, the trade unions or 
the opposition parties. With the exception of the two monarchies, namely 
Jordan and Morocco, all the other countries on the southern shores are gov-
erned by quasi - military regimes without proper political legitimacy. This 
is the core of the problem and thus the main obstacle to the introduction of 
pluralistic societies. Therefore the commitment to respect democratic prin-
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ciples and basic human rights, which is an essential element of the associa-
tion agreements, is likely to remain “lettre morte” for many years to come.  
The EU approach is rightly a pragmatic and incremental one. It is based on 
the hope that the introduction of free trade will oblige the partner countries 
to introduce more and more elements of the market economy, to reduce the 
role of the state in the economy, to privatise, to do away with all sorts of 
bureaucratic obstacles to economic activity and investment, both foreign 
and domestic. The gradual spreading of market forces will have a triple ef-
fect on the societies. It will raise the standard of living of the population, it 
will create new power centres that will want to participate in the political 
decisions and it will weaken the role of the state bureaucracies, the military 
and other “cliques”. It will also enhance transparency of the system, ac-
countability of the budget procedures through appropriate foreign assis-
tance procedures. And very gradually it will tend to loosen the grip of the 
various political “mafias” and family clans that presently cling to their 
power.  
The EU approach therefore seems to be basically correct. It is no different 
from that applied in the accession countries for the last 10 years that has 
achieved a great deal. But in Eastern Europe the EU had a much bigger 
prize to offer, i.e. membership in the club. And the EU interacted with 
European societies that wished nothing more than to return to the roots of 
their culture and to reunite with the rest of Europe. In the south, the EU’s 
leverage is infinitely more limited. The societies are infinitely less sophisti-
cated, the rulers do not want to part with their privileges, and the EU offers 
just some 1 billion Euros per year (instead of 3 billion) for a much bigger 
number of people (150 million instead of 100) that are much poorer (only 
20-30 percent of the living standard in the EU accession countries) and 
have an infinitely lower educational level. 
Concretely, the EU should therefore initially focus on the non-political, 
non-sensitive issues, such as issues related to the business and investment 
climate, the macro-economic framework, the banking system, the educa-
tional system, privatisation, the legal system and the functioning of the ju-
diciary. This is more than plenty on the agenda for the coming 5-10 years 
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that needs to be addressed. It corresponds to the basic and urgent needs of 
the countries. It is mostly acceptable to the governments. It is part of their 
ongoing reform processes, however slowly they may proceed. 
What does this require from the EU side? More focus on this reform proc-
ess, regular policy dialogue, both comprehensive and specific. Ideally, each 
of the Mediterranean partner countries that has ratified the association 
agreement should prepare an “association strategy”, a list of legislative re-
form actions to be implemented in a 3-5 year period. The EU should assist 
in the preparation of these programmes; it should put its funding behind 
them, monitor their implementation and disburse the funding according to 
the progress of implementation as is the case in structural adjustment fi-
nancing. 
Why has the Barcelona Process come under fire from both the EU and the 
MED side? Essentially, because of slow progress in implementation of the 
EMP’s financial cooperation, of dispersal of efforts, of lack of a clear po-
litical message, of hesitation on the part of the Mediterranean countries. For 
the Mediterranean countries, it was the normal procedure: when something 
goes wrong at home, blame the other side for the shortcomings and divert 
the attention from ones own shortcomings. Both sides can do much better, 
provided they return to the basic strategic goals of the Barcelona Process 
and concentrate all their energy on getting reforms more effectively done.  
The high expectations raised in 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration have not 
been fulfilled. They will not be fulfilled in the future unless there is a pro-
found change of awareness in the eight Arab Mediterranean partner coun-
tries. They have to “change gear”. Otherwise they will continue to fall be-
hind Europe, Asia and America. They should take lessons from Hungary, 
Estonia or Bulgaria or, more recently, in Turkey for how to do, in order to 
enable their populations to enjoy a better life, more freedom, better educa-
tion, more jobs, and less pollution. Everywhere they will find similar an-
swers: accountability and transparency of governments, market economy, 
higher standards of education, encouragement of civil society, particular of 
women, privatisation of the banking sector and major utilities, retreat of the 
government from direct interventions in the economic process.  
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The EU is willing and able to support whatever reforms governments will 
be prepared to launch and implement. The Association Agreements signed 
with all the Mediterranean countries, except Syria, and financial assistance 
are elements of such support. The establishment of free trade between the 
EU and each of the Mediterranean countries will, in due time, have a posi-
tive impact on the functioning of their economies. The case of Tunisia, the 
only country that is already somewhat advanced on the road towards free 
trade is telling in that respect. But the EU should do much more to stimu-
late and accelerate the necessary reform process in the South. And it should 
do so urgently. 
The EU is itself in a new stage of socio-economic reforms. Since Spring 
2000 it is engaged in the “Lisbon Process”, through which it hopes to be-
come the world` s most competitive economy by 2010. The EU should of-
fer its full support to all those countries in the South willing to move ahead 
with serious socio-economic reforms. With those volunteering for a joint 
reform effort it should start a process of “open coordination” in a few areas 
that are essential for more rapid socio-economic progress: education, in-
formation technology, deregulation, science and research, and good gov-
ernance. In return, the partner countries would commit themselves to a set 
of reform objectives and a strict calendar for implementation.  
The EU would have to offer substantial financial assistance to certain pack-
ages of the reform process. It would focus its assistance on those countries 
participating in the joint exercise. In doing so, the EU would transpose its 
precious experience with the transition countries in Central Europe to the 
Mediterranean. This will require substantially more personal and financial 
commitment on the part of the EU Commission and member states than 
during the past eight years.  
The EU should learn to do better in the future 
First, the EU needs to adopt more of a strategic approach. The problems of 
the Mediterranean will not be solved within a few years. Both sides have to 
think and act with a long-term horizon, say 2020. Linked to this is “com-
mitment”. It is hard to say that the EU has, in recent years, been truly 
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committed to the cause of development in the Mediterranean. The Mediter-
ranean has been just one among other priorities on the EU foreign policy 
agenda. The partner countries may not have eased the job. Whatever the 
past: without firm political will and commitment from both sides Barcelona 
will not succeed! 
Second, the EU should forget about public relations gimmicks. It should 
focus on those parts of the Barcelona process that really matter for the 
long-term socio-economic development. That is the standard by which 
coming generations will measure EU policies, not by the number of meet-
ings that have been held or the volumes of papers produced. 
Third, the EU should focus on improving bilateral links. Reforms will have 
to be undertaken by each and every country. Therefore the EU will have to 
enter into the substance of societal, administrative, legal, political devel-
opment blockages and try to unblock these. This will be a patient process 
that requires continuity of effort. It is here that much can be learnt from the 
experience with the accession countries. The EU should not be afraid of 
applying to the Mediterranean its technique of “accession strategies” which 
would become “association strategies”. The EU should sit down with each 
of the countries willing to undergo the experience and fix medium-term 
objectives for education, market opening, judiciary reforms and the assis-
tance to be offered for such reform programmes by the EU. In doing so, the 
EU should have the courage of using the “stick and carrot” approach: fund-
ing should be modulated according to the pace of reforms. The EU might 
start with the easy reforms, for example, customs procedures, tax laws, 
competition laws, so as to create “success stories”. 
Fourth, the regional approach should be somewhat down-graded and be 
given a new focus: the EU should try to introduce “open coordination” 
(Lisbon process) in the Mediterranean, for example, in fields like educa-
tion, taxation, and privatisation. Thus, the laggards may be shown how 
their own neighbours proceed and succeed. This may become an important 
tool of accelerating the overall pace of development, by creating emulation 
(and transparency) among the partner countries.  
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Fifth, the regional approach should involve encouragement of south-south 
free trade. After the Declaration of Agadir, the time is ripe to go ahead with 
south-south free trade. It may be best to start with the four most advanced 
countries but it should rapidly also associate the latecomers. Free trade 
among the south should be completed by 2010 latest. 
Sixth, the south-south free trade will only be attractive if the EU finally 
grants total cumulation of origin so that components from one country may 
be merged with those from any other Mediterranean country without value-
added constraints. Otherwise business investors will not find it sufficiently 
attractive to produce in the Mediterranean for exports to the EU. Without 
more FDI the Mediterranean will not be able to catch up with other parts of 
the world.  
Seventh, the EU should be prepared to progressively increase its financial 
support for the Mediterranean. The 700-800 million Euro p.a. for the whole 
region, Turkey included, is simply not good enough to make an impact. 
Eighth, financial support should be concentrated on the support of specific 
strategic policies, for example, education. The EU should try to bundle its 
own assistance with that of member states and multilateral donors and thus 
create more synergy. 
Ninth, the EU should focus its efforts on the eight Arab Mediterranean 
countries. These are the decisive elements for peace, stability and prosper-
ity in the Mediterranean. Cyprus and Malta will join the EU in 2004. Tur-
key may follow by 2015. Israel is a case apart which requires a different 
sort of attention. The economic and social development of the Mediterra-
nean does not depend exclusively on the progress registered towards peace 
between Israel and Palestine. The lack of peace must not be an alibi for the 
lack of reforms in the Maghreb or elsewhere. 
Tenth, with the progress of the south-south free trade area (FTA) in the 
Mediterranean, it will become even more important to focus more on the 
GCC (and Yemen) and to conclude the FTA with this sub region of the 
Mediterranean. This is important to complete Euro-Arab free trade by 
about 2015. 
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Eleventh, the EU should be much more open on the agricultural front. As it 
will liberalise its own agriculture, it should review its agricultural trade 
with the MED and progressively dismantle the remaining obstacles to free 
trade (calendars, reference prices etc.). This will not constitute a big boost 
to agricultural exports from the south but deprive the south from exagger-
ated criticism of EU double standards.  
The Barcelona Process is “the only game in town” and it will remain so for 
another two decades or longer. Europe cannot escape its southern neigh-
bours, however messy their socio-economic situation may become. And the 
Mediterranean countries will not avoid Europe being a major reference for 
their future development, from market economy, to high-tech research, 
freedom of the press, good governance, democracy and human rights. The 
Barcelona Process must, however not become a scapegoat for the failures 
of southern countries in doing their homework properly. The EU cannot 
undertake necessary reforms in the place of the governments in the partner 
countries. It can only make suggestions, share its own positive and negative 
experience with those who want to learn. It can try to transpose the basic 
methodology of the “Lisbon process” with its “benchmarking”, “open co-
ordination”, and target setting to those countries in the south that may wish 
to undertake a similar exercise adapted to their particular challenges. But it 
should – more than in the past – use its financial support, including that 
coming from individual member countries, to encourage and support those 
who are making serious reform efforts.  
It would be worthwhile to give a push in this direction and fill the Barce-
lona Process with new life, starting with one or two countries eager to push 
ahead their reforms. Once the ice is broken, others will follow suit. It has 
taken the EU 30 years to launch and start implementing a comprehensive 
Euro-Mediterranean policy. If the Barcelona Process is to provide the 
foundation upon which a “Pax Euro-Mediterranea” is to be established over 
the next 30 years, it is essential that the EU focus on spreading prosperity’s 
benefits more fairly with its neighbours in the south. The Mediterranean 
must not become a wall of poverty along the EU’s southern periphery. This 
is the ultimate challenge facing the international community in the Mediter-
ranean.  
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The three most active external actors in the Mediterranean, the EU, the 
United States, and NATO must focus their political and economic re-
sources on ensuring that the Mediterranean does not become a permanent 
north-south divide. If the existing perceptual and prosperity gap between 
the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are allowed to in-
crease, tension and hostilities across the Mediterranean will also become 
more widespread. In such circumstances, sources of instability that include 
terrorism, illegal migration, the proliferation of weapons and drug traffick-
ing are certain to multiply. Given the common strategic interests the EU, 
the United States and NATO have in the Mediterranean, co-ordinating their 
policies towards the part of the world will also provide them with an oppor-
tunity to further strengthen transatlantic relations.  
Only the creation of a co-operative Mediterranean region in which the per-
ceptual and prosperity gap is addressed, reduced and gradually eliminated, 
will ensure that the Mediterranean does not become a zone of indifference 
and an eventual economic wasteland. Integrating the Mediterranean into 
the twenty-first century international system through mechanisms such as 
the EU’s recently launched “Neighbourhood Policy” and a sustainable 
Middle East Peace Process is the immediate challenge that the international 
community must confront. Otherwise transnational sources of instability 
emanating from the Mediterranean will continue to manifest themselves at 
a regional and international level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above article is an adaptation of excerpts from Dr. Stephen Calleya’s forthcoming 
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Bechir Chourou  
European enlargement and its impact 
on the Barcelona process 
In May 2004 the European Union will acquire ten new members, thereby 
bringing its population to 450 million (an increase of 20 percent) and its 
gross domestic product (GDP) to over 8,200 million US-Dollar (an increase 
of 4 percent). An immediate effect of this enlargement will be a change in 
the make up of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership that was instituted fol-
lowing the adoption of the Barcelona declaration in 1995. Originally, the 
partnership was between the EU (representing its 15 members) and 12 
Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs). Two current MPCs – Malta and 
Cyprus – will become EU members, and one – Turkey – has been given the 
official status of candidate to membership (along with Romania and Bul-
garia). Therefore, the EMP will involve 25 EU members and 9 MPCs.  
It may be recalled that the general objective of the Barcelona Declaration 
was to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and 
cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, and to that effect 
it was decided “to establish a comprehensive partnership among the par-
ticipants – the EuroMediterranean Partnership – through strengthened po-
litical dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and finan-
cial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human 
dimension, these being the three aspects of the EuroMediterranean partner-
ship.” 
Since the Barcelona declaration is not a legally binding documents, the 
various forms of cooperation that it called for and the specific measures 
listed in the Work Programme attached to the Declaration have been for-
mulated in Association Agreements (AA) which the EU negotiated with 
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each Mediterranean Partner. As of October 2003, Israel, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia have signed and started implementing AA; Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Authority have interim agreements; agreements with Algeria 
and Egypt have been signed but are not yet in force; and only Syria is yet to 
conclude an AA. Upon accession, new EU members will start implement-
ing AA as they will stand in May 2004, i.e. rights and obligations defined 
by existing AA, and any other ones that may be adopted before that date, 
will be considered as “acquis communautaire” and will be applicable to old 
and new members alike. Similarly, MPCs will treat old and new EU mem-
bers in an identical manner, and their relations with Malta and Cyprus will 
be governed by these two countries’ new status as EU members. 
Keeping these facts in mind, the effects of enlargement on MPCs may be 
examined through an evaluation of the costs and benefits that MPCs may 
be expected to derive from applying the AA in the new EMP configuration. 
The effects on such activities as trade and investment can be projected with 
a fair degree of confidence, since there are reliable statistics that can be 
used to estimate possible future trends. But conclusions relating to the po-
litical and social areas can only be speculative, since future developments 
depend on attitudes, perceptions and values of decision-makers as well as 
on other subjective variables that are difficult to predict with certitude. 
Enlargement effects on trade 
In principle, EU enlargement will give the MPCs a privileged access to ten 
additional markets with a combined population of 75 million whose aver-
age individual income is over 4,300 US-Dollar (see Table 1 below). Non-
agricultural goods exported by the MPCs to these new markets will no 
longer be subject to tariffs whose average rate stands currently at 7 percent, 
and quotas for agricultural products may be increased as a result of en-
largement. 
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Table 1 - Comparative statistics for Euro-Med Partners (2000) 
Region/ 
Country 
Population 
(million) 
GDP  
(current k$)
GDP  
(PPP, k$) 
GDP/capita 
(current, k$) 
GDP/capita 
(PPP, k$) 
8 MPC  148  246,650  652,118  1,665  4,403 
15 EU  376  7,885,169  8,916,715  20,971  23,715 
10 ACs  75  327,094  792,512  4,355  10,553 
of which    
Czech Rep.  10  50,777 143,734 4,930  13,955 
Hungary 10 45,633  124,431  4,563  12,443 
Poland 39  157,739  349,838  4,076  9,040 
                 
Total 599  8,458,913  10,361,345  26,992  38,671 
                 
MPC/ACs 197%  75%  82%  38%  42% 
MPC/EU 39%  3%  7%  8%  19% 
MPC/EU25 33% 3% 7%  7%  13% 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002 
 
But at the same time, MPCs will have to lower duties they presently levy 
on goods originating in new member states (ACs) to align them on those 
applied to current EU members. Thus, in May 2004 tariffs on non-
agricultural imports will go down from 28 percent to 21 percent for Mo-
rocco, and from 27 percent to 11 percent for Tunisia; the rates will continue 
to be lowered until total dismantling according to schedules stipulated by 
the AA. Similar measures apply to agricultural goods, with an immediate 
reduction from 51 percent to 48 percent for goods entering Morocco, and 
from 81 percent to 77 percent for goods entering Tunisia. As for the other 4 
arab MPCs (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon), they will have to abolish 
tariffs on all goods imported from the ACs, since they presently levy no 
duties on any EU imports (the same applies to Syria when or if it signs an 
AA). It may be noted that those tariffs are quite high, ranging from 74 per-
cent levied by Egypt on agricultural products imported from non-EU coun-
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tries to 13 percent levied by Jordan on manufactured products coming from 
outside the EU (see Table 2 below).  
Consequently, MPC exports to ACs would benefit from lower tariffs, pro-
vided that this measure proves to be sufficient to make them competitive 
with similar goods sold by other exporting countries. With respect to MPC 
imports, lower tariffs may theoretically lead to both trade creation and trade 
diversion. In the first case, goods that were previously hampered by tariff 
walls will get better access to MPC markets as tariffs go down. In the sec-
ond case, some trade with the rest of the world may get diverted to the new 
EU members once the preferential arrangements go into effect. 
Table 2 - Estimated simple average tariffs in the EuroMed region, 
2000 
Country/Region  Imports from MFN countries  Imports from EU 
  
Non-agricultural 
products 
Agricultural 
products 
Non-agricultural 
products 
Agricultural 
products 
EU 15  4.1  16.2  --  -- 
              
Average ACs  7.3  24.1   0.4   16.3 
Czech Rep.  4.3  13.5  0  12.2 
Hungary 7.3  30 0.3  26.7 
Poland 10.3  33.8  0.9  24.2 
              
Average 7 MPC  18.96  40.89  15.71  39.99 
Algeria* 18.1 22.4  18.1  22.4 
Egypt* 20.3  73.8  20.3  73.8 
Jordan* 12.9 19.6  12.9  19.6 
Lebanon* 4.2  16.2  4.2  16.2 
Morocco 28.4  51.5  21.6  48.6 
Syria* 21.4  21.6  21.4  21.6 
Tunisia 27.4  81.1  11.5 77.7 
*These countries do not yet have preferential rates for EU goods, Source: DG Trade 
Market Access Database 
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However, the preceding discussion is purely theoretical, because in practice 
there is at present almost no trade between the ACs and the MPCs (see Ta-
ble 3). The former obtain only 0.6 percent of their imports from MPCs 
(compared with 49 percent from the EU) and send them 0.8 percent of their 
exports (62 percent go to the EU). Similarly, 1 percent of MPC imports 
come from the ACs, and 0.4 percent of their exports go there. Since prefer-
ential tariff rates practiced by ACs and MPCs are not significantly different 
from normal rates, it is unlikely that tariff reductions that will take place 
after the enlargement will increase existing trade between the two groups. 
Table 3 - Distribution of trade flows between regions, 1999  
(percent of total) 
Imports Exports 
Region/country  EU 15  ACs  MPC  EU 15  ACs  MPC 
EU 15  59.4  3.5  1.5  62.3  4.2  2.1 
ACs 62.7  9.5  0.6  68.8  12.9  0.8 
MPC 49  1  1.4  62.5  0.4  3 
Morocco 60.6  1  2  73.2  0.5  1 
Tunisia 71.4  0.8  1.9  80.5  0.4  1.9 
Algeria 56.2  1.5  1.4  63.9  0.3  1.5 
Egypt 35.5  1.3  0.8  35.3  0.7  9.1 
Jordan 31.4  0.8  4.8  5.8  0.1  12.3 
Lebanon 46.4  1.7  5.3  26  2.4  11.8 
Source: European Commission, Comtrade Database 
 
However, enlargement may – again, theoretically – lead to the emergence 
of two new types of trade flows. First, some firms from the ACs may take 
advantage of lower tariffs in the MPCs to position themselves in these new 
markets. However, this is an unlikely development, because if such firms 
had a real competitive advantage, MPCs would have purchased their goods. 
Of course, the case would be entirely different if those firms were competi-
tors for local producers, and tariffs were set deliberately high to protect 
those producers. In that case, once those protective tariffs are lowered or 
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abolished, ACs firms may seek entrance into MPC markets. But if such a 
development would be welcomed in the ACs, it will create serious difficul-
ties in the MPCs. Already, producers from present EU members are taking 
advantage of lower tariffs to sell more and more goods on MPC markets 
and, in the process, displacing less efficient local businesses. AC producers 
may follow suite, thereby creating additional pressure on local economies.  
The second type of trade flow that may appear following enlargement is 
intra-firm or business-to-business (B2B) trade. There are several sectors 
where cooperation between the ACs and MPCs is possible and could be 
mutually beneficial. Textiles and mechanical and electrical engineering are 
examples that come readily to mind. Joint ventures could be initiated in 
such sectors, each partner making a contribution on the basis of compara-
tive advantages. However, given the weaknesses of the manufacturing sec-
tor in the MPCs (insufficient financial resources, low level of technology, 
etc.), foreign partners would be required to make heavy investments to up-
grade MPC firms. The question of whether or not such investments would 
be forthcoming will be discussed in the following section. 
The last trade issue that needs examination is the loss of market shares that 
MPCs may incur in the EU as a result of enlargement. Between 1992 and 
2001, the share of MPC exports in EU markets declined by 10 percent 
(from 3.9 percent to 3.5 percent), whereas ACs’ market share increased by 
78 percent (from 4.8 percent to 9.8 percent; see Table 4). This trend is 
likely to continue as the new EU members get integrated in the single mar-
ket, as the multi-fibre agreements (AMF) get phased out, and as European 
markets become more accessible to producers from other regions under the 
effect of new GATT/WTO trade rules. 
Table 4 – AC & MPC Market Shares in EU Markets (percent) 
   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
AC 4.8  5.4  6.1  7.5  7.4 7.7 8.7 8.9 8.7 9.8 
MPC 3.9  3.8  3.6  3  3.2 3.3 2.9 3  3.4 3.5 
Source: European Commission – Comtrade database  
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This danger makes the need to create B2B trade all the more urgent, which 
brings us to the second question to be investigated, namely, the effect of 
enlargement on foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Enlargement effect on FDI 
Table 5 – EU FDI in Selected Regions and Countries 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 
 MPC*  475 430 456 842 1557  341  3500 
 of which Maghreb  264 119 218 623 504 109  326 
 of which Morocco  229 25  176 448 88  248  210 
 Mashrek  164 203 57  132 785 426  2403 
 of which Egypt  53 113  52 39 541  390 2104 
 AC**  2613 5090 5314 6496 8531 10514 12263 
 of which Poland  641 1132  2428  2492  4189  7500 9206 
 of which Czech Rep.  952 1593  1308  1916  1576  2479 2018 
*Excludes Turkey, Malta and Cyprus; **Excludes Malta and Cyprus; Source: Eurostat: 
EU foreign direct investment yearbook, 2001 
 
The track record of Arab countries in general, and of MPCs in particular, in 
attracting FDI has been poor and getting worse in the last few years (see 
Table 5). In 1997 the Mediterranean attracted one percent of world FDI 
flows, and held 1.3 percent of world FDI stock. In 2000 the figures became, 
respectively, 0.5 percent and 1.1 percent. Looking specifically at the EU’s 
FDI flows, they evolved rather irregularly, increasing substantially in 1998, 
then decreasing sharply in 1999, to increase just as sharply in 2000, reach-
ing some 3,500 million Euros. But even this record sum represented no 
more than one percent of total EU investments in the world; it barely 
equalled EU investments in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and repre-
sented 38 percent of EU investments in Poland. 
MPC businesses may not have greater success in attracting business part-
ners from the AC than they have been from the EU. From the point of view 
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of EU investors, MPC markets are not attractive for a variety of reasons 
(small markets, opaque bureaucracies, inadequate infrastructure, lack of 
qualified labour, etc.). As for AC businesses, not only would they be de-
terred by these same factors, they would also hesitate to associate with po-
tential competitors. Even before the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration, 
Easter European firms have been making inroads in EU markets at the det-
riment of MPCs, despite the fact that the latter had privileges that the for-
mer did not have (see Table 6). This is because Easter European businesses 
are more competitive than their Southern Mediterranean counterparts. Con-
sequently, they would see no reason to team up with competitors – except 
if they have the intention of absorbing them. Clearly, this is a difficult is-
sue, but there may be potential benefits for both parties to create strategic 
partnerships in selected sectors, and the MPCs should make a special effort 
to identify them. 
Table 6 – Market Shares of Selected Countries in EU Markets 
All Products – 1990 Constant Prices (1990 = 100) 
  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Tunisia 98.6  116.6  88.7  114.3 100.0 76.5  71.6  56.8 
Morocco 131.3  112.5  113.4  102.0 100.0 81.0  75.2  74.9 
Poland 84.2  87.2  82.9  78.3  100.0 123.5 140.0 164.7 
Czech Rep.  110.2  104.7  99.6  102.5 100.0 161.7 223.4 223.5 
Indonesia 73.5  77.4  89.0  86.3 100.0  98.4 142.3  160.9 
Source: Compiled from Eurostat 
At present there are no factors pointing to a short-term improvement of this 
situation. There is a need to reflect on measures that MPCs need to adopt – 
perhaps with the help of the EU – to attract a greater share of European 
FDI. In sum, and as far as the second basket of the Barcelona Declaration is 
concerned, MPCs have incurred a number of costs as a result of AA im-
plementation during the pre-enlargement period. Their trade deficit with 
Europe increased and government revenue decreased as a result of tariff 
dismantling. Market shares have stagnated or declined. Local businesses 
have had difficulties in adjusting to the loss of protection, and many of 
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them had to close down. Official development aid from the EU and private 
investment have been far below needs and are declining. Most of all, none 
of these trends are likely to be reversed, and will probably be reinforced as 
a result of enlargement – unless adequate measures are deliberately adopted 
and vigorously put into effect. This, however, can be achieved only if all 
parties concerned possess the necessary resolve and political will. 
Enlargement and political cooperation 
It is generally agreed that the Barcelona process, after eight years of exis-
tence, is nowhere near its objective of turning the Mediterranean into an 
area of peace, stability and shared prosperity. Efforts undertaken in the last 
three or four years to “re-launch” or “reinvigorate” the process have been 
fruitless. Among the reasons that have been advanced to explain this failure 
is the preoccupation of the EU with its enlargement to the East, a process 
that has monopolised the attention and the resources of the EU. According 
to those who hold this view, the low ranking of the Mediterranean in the 
EU list of priorities can be attributed to the preponderance of members who 
have few interactions with, and little interest in the Mediterranean. Techni-
cally, this view is valid, since only four of the fifteen EU members are 
Mediterranean or have been active in Mediterranean affairs (Greece is 
Mediterranean but not active in the Barcelona process, whereas Portugal is 
not Mediterranean but is quite active in that process). With the enlarge-
ment, the “Mediterranean Block” will gain two new members, one of 
whom – Malta – has been quite committed to the Barcelona process; but 
the “Northern bloc” will gain eight new members. Consequently, the voting 
power of the Mediterranean bloc will be reduced, and its influence is likely 
to get seriously diluted. 
In the South, the EU enlargement has not attracted the attention of civil so-
ciety. The few who are interested in the question tend to think that it will 
have little positive impact on them. Pointing to the AC stand on the Iraqi 
war and to Poland’s decision to send troops to Iraq, they argue that the 
enlarged EU will have difficulties in maintaining a balanced policy in the 
Middle East and in giving a fair hearing to Arab concerns. The current ten-
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dency of lumping the EU into an antagonistic West has simply included the 
AC in this camp. As for decision-makers, they continue to underline the 
fact the EU has dedicated and continues to dedicate more resources and 
attention to its future members than to its southern neighbours. They regret 
the days when the Southern Mediterranean, or at least parts of it, enjoyed 
greater attention and more privileges than Eastern Europe, and fear that 
whatever remains of that attention and those privileges will slowly whither 
away after the enlargement. 
Conclusion 
The Barcelona process has been at a dead end for quite some time. Numer-
ous efforts have been made to put it back on track. The most recent is the 
EU’s new policy of granting MPCs all the advantages of membership ex-
cept participation in EU institutions. It is not possible here to discuss the 
merits of this policy or the likelihood of its implementation in the frame-
work of an enlarged EU. But it may be argued that the problem with the 
Barcelona process is not the size of its membership but lies with its current 
structure and its underlying principles. First, the MPCs cannot expect to be 
economically attractive or to protect their interests if they do not participate 
in the Barcelona process as a single bloc. In this respect, the EU, to its 
credit, has been urging the MPCs to achieve, if not complete integration, at 
least greater horizontal cooperation. Secondly, relying on market forces 
alone to bring about greater welfare in the South has proved to be insuffi-
cient and even counterproductive. At the risk of being politically incorrect, 
it may be argued that numerous problems need vigorous public intervention 
for their resolution. This is valid not only for such activities as building in-
frastructure and improving educational and training facilities, but also for 
setting up common institutions, ordering investment priorities, allocating 
common economic projects, and obtaining better terms in negotiations with 
various potential partners. 
This is certainly a daunting task but despite the looming difficulties, one 
should not yield to pessimism or to resignation. For the near future, two 
tasks need to be undertaken urgently. First, a joint EU-MPC campaign to 
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demonstrate concretely that the EMP can indeed transform the Mediterra-
nean into an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity, and that the des-
tinies of both shores are intimately linked. Projects and activities should be 
launched to bring fast and effective relief to problems such as poverty and 
unemployment and, at the same time, to show EU solidarity with its south-
ern neighbours. 
The second task is for the MPCs to organise an awareness campaign in the 
ACs to convince public opinion and decision-makers there that the two re-
gions may have more common interests than it may appear at first glance. 
The gap that separates MPCs from the new EU members is not as wide as 
that with the old members, making cooperation psychologically and mate-
rially easier to start and to sustain. The experience gained by the ACs in 
achieving their post-1989 transformations can be of direct relevance to 
MPCs, and there would be little political cost arising from efforts made by 
the MPCs to seek greater involvement with the ACs. 
If we are to believe geologists the two shores of the Mediterranean are 
moving closer together and the distance between them may have narrowed 
by a fraction of a millimetre since 1995, the year of the proclamation of the 
Barcelona declaration. But this performance of the tectonic plates has not 
been matched by the region’s “political plates”. If anything, the two shores 
have moved further apart, and the distance separating them may even in-
crease after May 2004. Some in the South (a small minority, and continu-
ously shrinking) consider such a development as dangerous, and would like 
to stop and reverse it. Some in North (also a minority? also shrinking?) 
have the same view and desire. They all need to join efforts to convey their 
message to the recalcitrant or uncommitted members of the EU – old and 
new. 
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Krzysztof Bobinski 
European enlargement and the Barce-
lona process 
The Mediterranean, seen from most of the European Union’s new member 
states is a distant sea. The Barcelona process is a concept recognized by 
only the most diligent of students of European affairs in our countries. It is 
a struggle to get our domestic politicians to take an interest in salient EU 
related issues let alone something they consider to be as esoteric as a policy 
aimed at creating “a region of peace, stability and prosperity” in the Medi-
terranean. The Barcelona process is important but many of us in the “north-
ern” new member states don’t know it yet. In effect, it all depends on how 
you look at the map. 
Indeed when the Cold War came to an end in 1989, the eyes of the coun-
tries emerging from Soviet rule were fixed firmly on an east-west trajec-
tory. Former Soviet satellites like Poland looked east with trepidation and 
asked: was it really over? And they looked west with hope and asked: will 
their secure, rich man’s club accept us as members? In the east, Comecon 
and the Warsaw Pact dissolved without as much as a whimper while 
NATO and the European Union beckoned in the west as the two institu-
tions which had served the western Europeans well. We in the east thought 
they would also serve us just as well. The end of the Cold War meant that 
we were free to join both. But the end of the Cold War also meant that both 
organizations, and this is especially true of NATO, faced a challenge to 
their very existence. This meant they have had to change if they were to 
survive. As a result they are no longer the organizations we had read about 
in the text books. Suffice to say that Poland joined NATO to be secure and 
at peace and immediately found itself in a state of war over Kosovo. Also 
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the fact that we and the other economically backward central and eastern 
Europeans were joining these organizations meant that they would have to 
change. This is especially true of the European Union. Indeed it is becom-
ing quite clear that the EU of the 1980’s and 1990’s which did so much to 
develop the economies of “southern” countries such as Portugal and Spain 
as well as Greece has receded into the past. The new member states are 
joining a leaner, less generous EU. 
The end of the Cold War also meant the geo-strategic east-west axis quite 
suddenly become irrelevant. Indeed, thanks to the attack on the twin towers 
in New York and George Bush’s subsequent “war on terror” it is the north 
south divide around the Mediterranean and beyond Turkey’s southern bor-
der which has become the main geo-strategic axis for Europeans. For Poles 
and the Baltic states as well as the Central Europeans, who still see the 
prospect of a renewal of Russian territorial ambitions in Europe as a possi-
ble future threat this is a reality which it is difficult to come to terms with. 
Joining NATO in Polish eyes meant that when the Russians appeared on 
the country’s eastern frontier at Białystok, the armoured might of the west-
ern alliance would stop them in their tracks. Instead “new” and “old” 
NATO members are being told to prepare for “out of area” operations. 
Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq show that it is the Middle East where for the 
moment such operations might take place. 
Both enlargement and the Barcelona dialogue are processes which belong 
to the new post cold war order in Europe. However the new EU member 
states are only slowly getting accustomed to the idea that the new post cold 
war order means that they have joined organizations which are changing. 
And, paradoxically, it is the Americans, not the EU, who are forcing the 
new member states to face the reality that the map should be looked at from 
a north-south point of view and not only in the east west direction we have 
been looking at for the past two hundred years. Note for example the 
mooted locations of US military bases in Europe. There is talk of them be-
ing moved from Germany where the gun barrels pointed eastwards for so 
many years to countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary where atten-
tion will focus on the south. 
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This should give an impetus to the Barcelona process. The fact that most of 
the new member states are from the “north” does not necessarily suggest 
that the EU’s priorities will cease to take in “southern” issues and focus 
only on questions pertinent to the north and north east. Obviously the ac-
cession of Cyprus and Malta mean that the “southern lobby” in the EU will 
be strengthened. Should Cyprus remain divided then it will continue to at-
tract a great deal of attention in the EU especially in the context of forth-
coming accession talks with Turkey. Estonia, Latvia and most probably 
Lithuania will remain ‘northern’ in their outlook recognizing the greater 
claim of the Baltic to their attention rather than the Mediterranean. Also the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia will retain a “local” central Euro-
pean outlook and will probably show little interest in “southern” concerns. 
Hungary however as well as Bulgaria and Romania when they join in 2007 
can be expected to take an active interest in the southern rim not only be-
cause of their geographical location but also thanks to the fact that the US 
is focussing on operations in the middle east. And Poland because of its 
close relationship with the Bush White House and its military presence in 
Iraq will of necessity be pulled into the north south dialogue – hopefully 
within the context of the European Union alongside its bilateral relation-
ship with the US. 
However there are very important historical and cultural differences be-
tween the new member states and the present EU members who are most 
interested in the Barcelona process. Spain, France and Italy have a relation-
ship with the non EU Mediterranean countries which is rooted in their co-
lonial past. Portugal also has its “colonial” memory. Only Greece was a 
colonial subject like many of the new member states from central and east-
ern Europe. For the new member states, by contrast were all subjects of ei-
ther the Austro Hungarian empire, Russia, Prussia or Turkey (in the case of 
Bulgaria) and Poland was partitioned for over 100 years by the first three. 
This is a difference which must be borne in mind. However it is unclear 
whether this will have a positive or negative effect on the dialogue between 
the two Mediterranean shores. The new member states have no sense of 
guilt towards their non EU Mediterranean partners nor do they have a sense 
of obligation to support them. They do not share a common language nor 
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are there any links deriving from mass inward immigration or the colonial 
past. On the other hand the “new” Europeans, as a group of underdevel-
oped countries in the EU and with a history of being victims of colonial 
processes, could feel more sympathy for the plight of the non EU Mediter-
ranean partners. Indeed if press reports are to be believed the Polish mili-
tary contingent in Iraq is having success in stabilizing its area of command 
by adopting the pose of the friends of the Iraqi people rather than adopting 
the uncompromising stance of occupiers of the country. 
Poland is the special case among the new member states. It is a large coun-
try and its recent history of partition and repression has failed to erase a 
sense that the country is destined to play a major role in the story of na-
tions. This is one of the reasons for the decision to go into Iraq on the coat 
tails of the Americans. Indeed Poland’s presence in Iraq means that it could 
play a greater role in the Barcelona process than might be expected. 
On the face of it, the auguries for this are not good. Poland’s historic links 
with the southern Mediterranean rim countries are weak. At the moment 
they mainly come down to a tourist traffic which admittedly is growing. In 
the recent past Poles have been in the Middle East and North Africa mainly 
at the bidding of the great powers as participants in conflicts which were 
not of their own making. First a military and civilian contingent over 
100,000 strong traversed the region from Iran to Egypt between 1942 and 
1944. They were part of the allied forces in the 2
nd World War. Originally 
they had been deported to Russia at the beginning of the war and then in 
1941 allowed by Stalin to leave through Iran. Secondly the 1970s and 
1980s saw Polish companies involved in infrastructure projects in countries 
such as Iraq and Libya as part of commercial agreements sanctioned by the 
Soviet Union. Now a Polish military contingent is actively occupying a part 
of Iraq at the behest of the United States. 
There were many reasons why Poland took this rather exotic decision to go 
to Iraq. It was part of a conscious effort by the country’s post communist 
ruling left Democratic Alliance (SLD) party to adopt an “American” option 
in the hope that this would bring a growth in inward investment from the 
US. This followed the conclusion of the accession negotiations in Copen-
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hagen in December 2002 which showed that the EU was ready to agree to 
less than generous terms for the new members. Subsequent events and the 
first indications on the financial perspective for 2007 to 2013 as well as 
proposed changes in regional policies confirm that the EU in coming years 
will indeed be less friendly to poor new member states than it has been in 
the past. Fortunately for the EU, the US has in the intervening months 
given Poland little hope that its loyal stance on Iraq will produce immediate 
economic benefits which could outweigh the aid the country might get 
from the EU in the present decade. Secondly, if one remembers that the po-
litical party currently ruling Poland has its roots in the communist past then 
it will be no surprise that it is happy to gain the respectability to be ob-
tained from a close relationship with a Republican White House. But most 
important of all there is a cross party consensus that everything possible 
must be done to keep the Americans in a strong NATO and in Europe. For 
the Poles, and this is probably true of the other new member states, con-
tinue to fear a resurgence of Russian ambitions in central Europe and for 
this reason want to keep the Americans engaged in Europe. And if the price 
is going to Iraq then Poland’s political elites think that that price ought to 
be paid. That suggests that in the near and medium term Poland will con-
tinue to be involved in the Middle East at America’s side. This also means 
that the country as an EU member will retain a sensitivity for the region 
with obvious advantages for the Barcelona process. 
Poland’s insurance policy against a resurgence of a threat from the east is 
to be in Baghdad in the hope that at some time in the future the Americans 
will repay the favour by defending Białystok. The other face of this policy 
is and will be a drive to persuade the EU to conduct an eastern policy 
which will seek to guard against the occurrence of such an eventuality. Po-
land is keen that the Ukraine should continue to retain its independence of 
Moscow and that it should maintain its pro EU stance. Part of that policy 
will be to maintain good relations with Russia and work for a democratiza-
tion of Belarus in order to remove a semi totalitarian regime from Poland’s 
border. This is also very much in tune with the “wider europe” strategy 
prepared by the European Commission. This plan presented by Gunter 
Verheugen envisages an active EU policy towards Morocco, Tunisia, Jor-
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dan and Israel in the south and Russia, the Ukraine and Moldowa in the 
east. Its implementation will help to balance the EU’s attention on both “di-
rections”. 
Poland’s policy should also include active support for Turkish membership 
of the EU. Turkish accession, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, 
would bring a significant element of stability to the Middle East and give 
the EU a border not only with countries like Iraq but also with the Cauca-
sus in the north. Poland is well suited to conducting a pro Turkish policy as 
its historic trading links give it a common past with the Ottomans much in 
the same way as Venice shares its history with them. And it is here, work-
ing to support the accession of a Muslim if secular state to the EU that Po-
land’s eastern policy could make its most important contribution to the 
Barcelona process. 
I have sought to explain that it is the United States which has been instru-
mental in redirecting the “strategic gaze” of some of the new EU member 
states southwards. In Poland’s case it has actually put the country onto the 
field of battle. The question now is whether the dialogue with the Muslim 
world will be continue to be conducted at the point of a gun or whether 
enlargement states like Poland will turn more to “soft power” processes 
usually espoused by the European Union. Poland as I have mentioned is, in 
a sense, already attempting in Iraq to present itself to the local population 
as “one of them” rather than a dominant force. “We are underdogs too and 
we know how it feels”, they seem to be saying. However this is happening 
at the side of the Americans and not within an EU context. 
Thanks to media coverage of the Polish presence in Iraq, Polish public 
opinion is more aware than ever of the problems of the Middle East and the 
challenge to stability that the area presents. However there is almost no 
awareness of the fact that the EU, potentially, presents an alternative to the 
US approach to the region. Few know for example of the EU aid pro-
gramme to Palestine. As the Barcelona process is primarily about dialogue 
and this dialogue was initiated in 1995 it seems unnecessary to repeat that 
dialogue between the Arab world and the EU must be kept up and ex-
tended. Given the current intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it may 
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be that such efforts will yield scant results. The situation in Iraq is also not 
conducive to dialogue.  
However at present there is an opportunity to underline that Christians, 
Muslims and Jews are united in a common European heritage. This could 
have beneficial effects in the medium and long term. This is the work 
which is being done on Europe’s draft Constitutional Treaty by the inter-
governmental conference which started in Rome on October 4. Poland and 
several other countries such as Spain are arguing that the preamble to the 
text should include a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage in place of 
the mention of “religious” values which was included in the draft prepared 
by the Convention on the Future of Europe. It would however seem appro-
priate that as those of us who pray in the Muslim, Jewish and Christian 
world, are praying to the same God and that as each of these religions has 
influenced and continues to influence the development of Europe, the pre-
amble should contain a reference to all three religions. If that proves im-
possible then none should be mentioned. The inclusion of all three would 
signal that the European Union was open to all the religious and cultural 
traditions within its orbit. It would ease Turkish entry into the EU, make it 
easier to conduct policies in the Balkans and mediate in the Middle East. 
The retention of the reference to religious heritage would have the same 
effect. However a mere reference to Christianity would represent the worst 
possible of all outcomes. 
I doubt if the delegates to the IGC will be thinking in these terms. Everyone 
will still be worrying how to get around France’s objections to the insertion 
of a clear reference to religion in what that country considers to be a secu-
lar document. Turkey, as a secular state, also has its hands tied although it 
would clearly be in that country’s interest to have the Muslim religion men-
tioned as a strand in European history. This is a relatively small and clearly 
symbolic issue but it does show that even among the present member states 
consideration about how to further the Barcelona process is nowhere near 
the top of the agenda. This was a point made by Kurt Biedenkopf, the for-
mer prime minister of Saxony at a recent conference on enlargement in Vi-
enna. He complained bitterly that he could get none of Germany’s leaders 
to take an interest in the EU’s own dialogue with the arab countries south 
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of the Mediterranean even though he himself thought that this was the most 
important issue facing the EU at present. Alvaro de Vasconcelos expressed 
his frustration about the process at a conference organized by the ZEI and 
the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation last December. Then he despaired that 
the dialogue “is absent” on the political and security basket and he sug-
gested that the process should concentrate on the establishment of a free 
trade area. 
After the US invasion of Iraq and the growing tension between Israel and 
Palestine it seems that giving new impetus to the Barcelona process is more 
difficult than ever. The IGC promises to be an exhausting affair. The de-
bate on the financial perspective for 2007 to 2013 as well as the model of 
regional policy which will be followed in those years will also be difficult 
as the new member states fight to retain the vestiges of the more generous 
policy of former years. All this will be taking place against a background of 
continuing budget problems in Germany and France. EU member states 
will also be ratifying the constitutional treaty and with referendums 
planned in some cities this will be fraught with crises. With all this happen-
ing will it be possible to get EU leaders to focus on the problems of the 
Mediterranean basin and the Middle East?  
The European Union has an obvious strategic interest in working to bring 
stability to the states on the southern rim of the Mediterranean and to ad-
dressing the problems of slow economic growth and high population 
growth which are already putting pressure for immigration on the southern 
EU member states. But making the Barcelona process work is a test for the 
EU itself as in the post cold war era it seeks to regain its sense of mission. 
The process of European Integration was set in train after the second world 
war to end once and for all the murderous tribal wars which blighted the 
last century.  
European Integration is a process in which nation states can secure their 
interests by working together and without reaching for arms. This idea of 
states working together in peace is the message that the EU should be 
propagating as part of the Barcelona process. The “soft power” the EU  
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represents should be brought to be bear in the Middle East with greater de-
termination. It should as far as possible replace the model the US has 
brought to the area. EU leaders have to show the will for this to happen. 
Should that political will be forthcoming then there is every possibility that 
the new member states will follow suit. 
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Mapping the impact of enlargement on 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Introduction  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1989 the European Communities and 
the European Union, respectively, focused on establishing the relationship 
with the countries of the former communist bloc. The process, often termed 
“a historic reunification of Europe” diverted the attention of the EU mem-
bers to the East, and consequently the amount of attention paid to the Cen-
tral and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
1 increased enormously. In 
view of the EU members, this change of course, as it were, was more than 
justified.
2 Among many other benefits, the then Twelve were hoping for 
significant security dividends to be paid because of their investment into 
the Central and Eastern Europe. After all, the CEECs represented an imme-
diate neighbourhood to the EU,
3 a neighbourhood that at the time was (per-
ceived) a partner with enormous economic potential, yet vulnerable and 
politically insecure – the two drawbacks that needed to be checked imme-
diately.  
1  The term refers to the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia), the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Slovenia, Ro-
mania and Bulgaria. 
2  For a coherent analysis of the question of legitimacy and justification in the EU’s 
enlargement policy see Sjursen 2002. 
3  At the time of the fall of the iron curtain, and before the 1995 enlargement, only two 
member states of the EC, Italy and Germany, had immediate borders with the 
CEECs. 
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When the first Association Agreements were signed with Poland and Hun-
gary in December 1991, the idea of enlargement of the EC to include at 
least some of the former European socialist countries was already roaming 
in the minds of the European decision-makers. Article 49 of the Treaty on 
European Union
4 has to be read in this context. Accordingly, any democ-
ratic European country can apply for the membership. The “Europeanness” 
of the CEECs was never questioned, and when the Copenhagen criteria set 
out the conditions for the membership,
5 the process of enlargement could 
begin.  
Regardless of its making the CEECs an utmost priority, the EU has been 
reminded continuously from the beginning of the 1990s that its new focus 
to the East should not let its Southern relations to a neglect. The Moroccan 
wishes for closer economic ties with the EU, the Gulf War, the political 
crisis in Algeria and the re-opened Middle East Peace Process that led to 
the signing of the Oslo Treaty in October 1993 are only the most significant 
issues that emerged at the time, and which acted as an impetus for Mediter-
ranean member states to pursue a more active Mediterranean policy in the 
EU (Parfitt 1997: 867; Rhein 2002: 702-703). Spain used its 1995 Presi-
dency to the best of its potentials by bringing the Mediterranean issue back 
to the top of the European agenda, and with an impressive result: the 
launch of the Barcelona process.
6 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP), invigorated by the Barcelona Declaration, replaced and qualita-
tively upgraded the previous Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) of the 
EC. 
 
4  Also known as Maastricht Treaty, was signed on the 7 February 1992, only a couple 
of months after the signing of the Association Agreements with Poland and Hun-
gary.  
5  In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council meeting, the Member States set the 
criteria for membership in the Union. The so called Copenhagen Criteria state that 
in order to become a member of the Union a country must be a stable democracy, 
have a functioning market economy and be able to take on the obligations of mem-
bership in the EU. The Council Regulation 622/98 later upgraded the criteria to le-
gally binding conditions. 
6  For a detailed account of activities of the Southern member states in relation to the 
Mediterranean policy of the Union in the first half of the 1990s, see Barbé (1998).  
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In short, it seems quite obvious that the two processes – the EU enlarge-
ment and the EU relations with so-called Mediterranean non-member coun-
tries (MNMCs)
7 – can hardly be discussed separately from each other as 
they both touch EU’s inner and outer stability. The EU itself seemed aware 
of this, as the EMP was created largely as a consequence of a need to bal-
ance the Union’s relations towards the East with relations towards the 
South (Barbé 1998). In this vein, the study seeks to define various aspects 
of the influence of enlargement on the EMP and, by doing so, to depart 
from a too simplistic view of the impact of enlargement on the EMP as one 
of neglect and financial deprivation. Instead, it will try to put the different 
levels of the enlargement-effect into perspective. It will be argued that al-
though on one side the Eastern enlargement used enormous resources and 
took some focus away from the Mediterranean, it acted, on the other side, 
as a strong incentive for the Mediterranean EU-member states to launch a 
more coherent and all-embracing policy towards the Southern Mediterra-
nean.  
The study will proceed with an outline of possible ways of impact of en-
largement on the EMP. The analysis will look at: i) the impact resulting 
from the enlargement process as such; and ii) the situation after the en-
largement has been completed, i.e. after the actual accession of the new 
members takes place. To illustrate the analysis, the study will evaluate the 
significance of the accession from the perspective of new Mediterranean 
member states to the Union, i.e. Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia, with the spe-
cial focus on the latter. Slovenia seems to make a relevant case study. It is a 
new member state of the EU, generally regarded as a CEEC, yet very much 
in the process of exploring its Mediterranean identity. In this respect, it 
seems pertinent to ask the question, what if anything may be expected from 
Slovenia, a new EU member, in terms of its attitudes towards the EMP?  
 
 
7  Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. 
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Mapping the impact of enlargement on the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership 
The impact of the process of enlargement is too often seen as that of ne-
glect for the Southern neighbours of the EU, as the integration with the 
East absorbed much of the EU’s energy (Dinan 1994/1999: 496; Miralles 
and Johansson 2002: 1; Weltner-Puig 2003: 208). The comparison of the 
EU’s financial assistance to both regions is at hand to prove such claims. 
Although the EU had doubled its financial assistance to the Mediterranean 
in the first half of the 1990s (Rhein 2002: 703), the comparison of the fi-
nancial aid and structural assistance given to the CEECs and the MNMCs 
in the early 1990s shows that the ratio was 2,5 to 1 in favour of the CEECs. 
In terms of respective populations, this means five ECU for every CEECs 
citizen and one ECU for every MNMC citizen (Barbé 1998: 120). How-
ever, the impact of the process of enlargement on the EMP is not confined 
solely to (the assumptions of) the diversion of the EU’s financial assistance 
flows from the Southern and South-Eastern Mediterranean to the CEECs.  
As already indicated, the mapping which we propose to do will differenti-
ate between the process of enlargement, i.e. the process that has been tak-
ing place since the early 1990s and is now coming to a successful close for 
the majority of CEECs,
8 plus Cyprus and Malta; and the impact of the ac-
tual accession of these countries to the Union on the future of the EMP. 
Within each of these two “periods”, the impact of enlargement on the EMP 
has to be assessed by analysing the changes that enlargement brought: i) to 
internal EU matters; ii) to shaping of the relations with Mediterranean; and, 
iii) more broadly, within the framework of the changes in global European 
role. Finally, iv) the changes in candidate countries (new member states) 
with a possible impact on the EMP and MNMCs will be considered.  
 
 
8  Eight CEECs shall accede to the Union on 1 May 2004, Bulgaria and Romania are 
envisaged to join the EU in 2007. 
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The impact of the process of enlargement on the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership 
The enlargement influenced internal constellations of interests in the EU 
and the nature of the European policy making. The endeavours taken by the 
EU in the process of enlargement were primarily driven by the countries 
that have immediate borders with some of the CEECs, which caused con-
cerns in the southern EU member states. The latter seized the political op-
portunity to stress the need of a more vigorous approach towards the south-
ern neighbours. As a result, the need for balancing the eastern and southern 
relations has been present all the way through the enlargement process,
9 
and since as early as during the intergovernmental conferences of 1991 
(Maresceau and Lannon 2001: xix). Consequently, one may conclude that 
the process of enlargement did in fact act as an impetus for the creation of 
the new policy towards the Mediterranean basin.
10  
Further, the process of enlargement influenced the shaping of the EMP. 
The relations between the EU and the Southern and South-Eastern Mediter-
ranean countries prior to the EMP were based on the GMP,
11 which was 
 
9  Barbé (1998) showed the complex nature of relations towards the two neighbouring 
regions, by pointing at the balancing of the relations to the east by those to the south 
of the EU. 
10  The balancing of eastern and southern relations was not, of course, the only external 
policy that accompanied the process of enlargement. The pursuit of geopolitical as-
pects in the foreign relation of the EU and the specific spheres of influence of cer-
tain member states, can be further seen with the Nordic countries efforts in the 
Northern dimension policies of the Union (Sicard Filtenborg, Gänzle and Johansson 
2002). The Polish advocacy of the closer relations of the Union with the New Inde-
pendent States (NIS) fits into this trend as well. See e.g. “Non-paper with Polish 
proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlarge-
ment”, as well as the speech by Polish foreign minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
“The Eastern Dimension of the European Union. The Polish View”, delivered at the 
conference “The EU Enlargement and the New Neighbourhood Policy”, in Warsaw, 
on 20 February 2003. Both documents are available at 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/start.php (5 October 2003). 
11  In order to replace the number of bilateral trade agreements between the EC and the 
Mediterranean countries, the GMP was adopted at the 1972 Paris Summit of the 
Heads of State and Government of the EC. 
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limited to governing the trade relations in industrial and agricultural goods 
between the EC and the Mediterranean countries (Lister 1997: 85). The 
Barcelona Declaration,
12 though overly optimistic in its objectives, goes 
beyond sheer enforcement of the economic ties between the two regions, to 
include political, security, economic and financial as well as social and cul-
tural aspects of relations. The economic cooperation within the EMP shows 
significant similarity to the early shaping of the relations between the EU 
and the CEECs (Rhein 2002: 703). The principle of conditionality, intro-
duced by the Copenhagen criteria and further developed and applied in the 
Europe Agreements with the CEECs, is introduced in relation to the Medi-
terranean basin, in Barcelona Declaration as well as in the Association 
Agreements with respective MNMCs (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 
2001: 119ff). Finally, the financial and technical measures to accompany 
the reform of economic and social structures (MEDA) in the framework of 
the EMP as the main instrument for implementing the financial assistance 
towards the MNMCs have been reshaped
13 to follow the PHARE model of 
assistance to the CEECs (Prosperini 2003: 190).  
The introduction of the conditionality principle in the context of enlarge-
ment, and in relation to the MNMCs, also needs to be viewed at from a 
wider perspective of the EU’s global role. The period of preparations for 
enlargement has been marked by the EU’s increasing awareness of its role 
as a global actor. The changes in the international community, above all the 
end of the Cold war and the process of globalisation changed the ambitions 
of the EU members in the EU’s external affairs. Beyond primarily eco-
nomic orientation, the EU’s external policies became increasingly accom-
panied with an ambition of political actorness in global affairs. Such new 
assertiveness (Rummel 1990) in the European foreign policy warranted in-
ternal cohesion (Copenhagen criteria) and allowed for the inclusion of po-
 
12  Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27-28 November 1995.  
13  Regulation of the Council No.2698/2000 of 27 November 2000. 
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litical conditionality in shaping of relations with countries or groups of 
countries, without giving them the prospect of membership.
14  
In economics, the increased foreign direct investment (FDI) flow in the 
CEECs is often mentioned as the primary negative impact of enlargement 
on the EMP.
15 However, it is disputable whether these flows have been 
ever diverted from the Mediterranean region at all. The investment flow in 
the CEECs is predominantly a consequence of the changes in business op-
portunities and the economic stability resulting from the transformation of 
economies and regulation of the markets backed by the adoption of the 
“acquis communautaire”  (Dunning 1993; UNCTAD 1998: 279-289). 
Khader (2003: 14) recognises that the Mediterranean basin does not com-
pete for the FDI with the CEECs, but with other regions of the world where 
European FDI have been growing in the last decade.
16 This does not mean, 
of course, that lessons cannot be learned from the CEECs experience with 
the FDI. The relatively smooth, fast, and successful transformation of the 
formerly planned economies into the functioning market ones could be 
viewed as a model and incentive for the Southern Mediterranean econo-
mies. 
Finally, transformation of the CEECs into the open market economy and 
functioning democracy resulted in them becoming a potential market for 
 
14  On the politicisation of relations to other regional groupings in the course of 1990s 
see Allen and Smith (1996). For the inclusion of political aspects in the relations 
with Mercosur countries see Sanchez Bajo (1999); for relations with ASEAN com-
pare Forster (1999) and Richards (1999). 
15  The FDI transactions in the CEECs began to grow increasingly from 1996 onwards. 
The sum of inward and outward FDI flows soared from ECU 10,5 Billion in 1995 to 
EUR 23,7 billion in 2000, being mainly composed of inward flows that accounted 
for more than 90percent of the sum (Eurostat 2002a: 1). The share of FDI from the 
EU member states grew from ECU 6,5 billion in 1996 to EUR 19 billion in 2000 
(Eurostat 2002b: 1). Meanwhile the FDI flows from the EU member states to the 
MNMCs amounted to 872 million in 1996 and grew to 3,6 billion in 2000 (Eurostat 
2003: 2).  
16  Data on the destination of the European FDI outside of the EU show e.g. that 10.8 
percent of the European FDI in 2000 was directed towards Latin America, whereas 
only 1.5 percent went to the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
(Femise Annual Report 2002: 36-37). 
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some of the Mediterranean products as well as in them becoming generally 
more interested in the Mediterranean area.
17 However, during the course of 
the enlargement process these countries were absorbed in their own prepa-
rations for accession to the EU, therefore the effects of these changes, rele-
vant for the EMP and MNMCs in general, can only be expected to be seen 
after the enlargement.  
The EMP after the accession 
At the EU level, there is a change in political, economic as well as in cul-
tural aspects, which is likely to influence the future Mediterranean policy. 
In terms of political changes that will be brought about by accession of the 
ten new members, the first change to be observed is a decrease in the insti-
tutional weight of the Mediterranean countries in the EU decision-making 
process. Malta, Cyprus, and Slovenia are among the smallest old and new 
members, with a small weight in the decision-making process in the Coun-
cil of Ministers as well as in the European Parliament (EP). A look into the 
size and geographical position of the new member countries – take for in-
stance Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary – promise that the geopo-
litical weight within the EU will be moved towards East and North.
18 The 
question also arises whether the enlarged EU will turn more introspect as it 
happened in the periods following previous enlargements. The Commis-
 
17  Khader (2003: 14) points to the positive impact the welfare in the new member 
states and their newly developed interest in the Mediterranean might have on the 
Mediterranean tourism. 
18  Following the distribution of votes in the EP as determined by the Treaty of Nice, of 
the 147 seats in the EP that are envisaged for the ten new member states only 18 fall 
to the three new Mediterranean countries (Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia). The ratio of 
the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers, as designated according to the 
Treaty of Nice, is similar, with the three countries comprising only 11 votes of the 
147 votes of the new member states all together. The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
Constitution for Europe envisages the qualified majority in the decision-making of 
the Council of Ministers consisting of two thirds of the member states, representing 
at least three fifths of the population of the Union. Malta, Cyprus, and Slovenia to-
gether represent only 4,13percent of the population of the ten new members, which 
even lessens their weight in the Council decision-making. 
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sion’s document “Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood Policy”,
19 as the 
clearest expression of the future European proximity policy, “serves to as-
suage neighbours’ concerns that the enlargement will mean a ‘Fortress 
Europe’ or that it will cause new divisions in and around Europe” 
(Johansson 2002: 4). The document does not differentiate between the 
EU’s southern and eastern neighbours, but it seeks to building such a rela-
tionship between the EU and its new members in which they will, in words 
of Commission President Romano Prodi “share everything but institutions” 
(Agence Europe, 12 March 2003).  
In terms of change in the EU policies, with the external effect on the 
MNMCs, policies covering areas such as trade, energy, FDI and agricul-
tural as well as migration policies deserve to be looked at more closely.
20 
As already noted above, the FDI flows into the CEECs do not compete 
with the flows into the MNMCs. However, it is worth noting that accession 
shall not bring considerable alterations in the FDI trend in the CEECs. Sta-
tistics shows that with reference to the FDI the CEECs are already inte-
grated in the EU (Eurostat 2002b: 2).
21 While trade dependence of the 
MNMCs to the EU will increase only slightly, since the acceding CEECs 
have a very poor record of economic ties with the countries of Southern 
Mediterranean, the picture is somewhat in terms of energy dependence of 
the EU on the outside world. This will increase, but into direction East and 
not South, since the new members largely depend on energy resources, like 
gas supplies, from the countries of the former Soviet Union. However, a 
greater energy dependence on NIS and Russia might not be deemed par-
ticularly desirable, and steps towards diversification of this dependence 
may be envisaged (e.g. extending present pipelines originating in the 
 
19  Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, communication of the European 
Commission from 11 March 2003. 
20  For an analysis of change brought about by enlargement in various EU policies with 
the effect on the EMP compare with Tovias (2001). 
21  This conclusion is based on comparison between the percentage of intra-EU origin 
FDI and extra-EU origin FDI flows to the EU and the CEECs, respectively, for the 
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MNMCs to Cyprus, Hungary and Slovenia should be thought upon in this 
context) (Tovias 2001: 379-380). For the agricultural policy of the EU it is 
important to note that the substantial increase in agricultural land, without a 
major reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), will lead to an 
increased role of the EU as a food supplier to the outside world and even to 
a production of some farm products which might compete with MNMCs 
exports to the EU (e.g. potatoes, vegetables and flowers). No less important 
could be the effect of inclusion of Cyprus into the common fisheries policy. 
With the EU backing it, the change in the efficiency of the agreements on 
fishing in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone is likely to occur (Tovias 2001: 
378). The same applies to exploitation of seabed resources such as gas or 
oil. Although much disputed in the course of accession negotiations, the 
envisaged migration flows from the new member states to the old member 
states do not amount to numbers that would imply an even stricter policy of 
legal and legitimate migration to the EU from the MNMCs.
 22 
Finally, there is a socio-cultural aspect that should be thought upon. The 
new member states are, perhaps to a greater extent than the old member 
states, homogenous and relatively closed societies in which stereotypes are 
still very much alive. The lack of contact between the CEECs and the 
MNMCs resulted in a situation, where we can almost talk of the oblivion. 
The participation of the new member states in the programmes of cultural, 
social and human co-operation within the framework of the EMP, will help 
these two regions to slowly get familiar with each other. 
Turning to the attitudes of the new member states towards the Mediterra-
nean, the first observation would be that they are silent about their inten-
tions concerning the post-Enlargement external agenda. They are not 
against further enlargement to include 27, 28 or 29 countries (Tovias 2001: 
381). But their focus will most surely be in the South Eastern Europe and in 
Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. Many of the candidates until re-
 
period between 1996 and 2000. The data show conversion in the percentage rate of 
the both types of the FDI between the regions.  
22  For a detailed analysis of migration expectations from the CEECs to the EU see 
Brückner (2000). For a migration potential of the CEECs with reference to the 
MNMCs see also Khader (2003). 
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cently did not have a Mediterranean policy of their own (with the exception 
of Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) (Tovias 2001: 382-383). 
However, of importance to the EMP are their stands on issues such as for-
eign trade, agriculture, development aid policy, and migration policy.
23 It is 
worth noting that with regard to foreign trade the candidates are split 
among those which might be pursuing a more liberal approach (e.g., Esto-
nia, Poland and the Czech Republic), and those which seem more reluctant 
towards the freer trade (e.g. Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia), which is the op-
posite to their stands on agriculture – the issue on which they might as a 
whole press for a liberalization of the CAP at least for the products they 
themselves do not produce. This is an attitude, very much in contrast with 
that of Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Tovias 2001: 382). Concerning devel-
opment aid, the new members will fulfil their obligations. Yet, they largely 
perceive themselves as developing countries as well, and therefore do not 
consider themselves major partners in development policy (Tovias 2001: 
383).  
Slovenia, a new Mediterranean member state  
The inclusion of the three Mediterranean countries will not serve as balanc-
ing of the Eastern and Southern policies of the EU in terms of decision-
making in the Union. Still, the fact that among the new members there are 
also countries members of the EMP (Malta and Cyprus) and Slovenia, also 
a Mediterranean state, is surely worthwhile noting at the very least.  
Malta and Cyprus are often seen as a bridge between the EU and the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. They both have closer commercial 
and economic ties with the region and are advocates of and keen partici-
pants in all Pan-Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean initiatives 
(Tovias 2001: 392; Calleya 2002: 89-92; Melakopides 2003: 2; Vaquer i 
Fanés 2003: 67). Their foreign policy links with the Arab Mediterranean 
 
23  For an excellent overview of the candidate countries attitudes, though only of the 
countries of the so-called Luxembourg group, towards policies that might affect the 
MNMCs, see Tovias (2001).  
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countries as well as with Israel might be an asset in the Union’s role in the 
Middle East peace process.  
Slovenia, though being considered a Mediterranean country,
24 does not 
have an immediate border with any of the countries of the Southern Medi-
terranean. During its years of independence, Slovenia has been busy with 
“catching up” during the process of accession to the EU and NATO. Slove-
nia also devoted much of its time and energy to emerging bilateral issues 
with the neighbouring countries and to an active role that it began to play in 
the Western Balkans. It is understandable that little resources were at dis-
posal for foreign policies beyond these immediate concerns. Nevertheless, 
Slovenia has started the process of developing a coherent Mediterranean 
policy. With it becoming a member of the EU, the perception of proximity 
will also change.  
Some evidence to confirm this assumption can already be seen. Since the 
successful conclusion of the accession endeavours in relation to both inte-
grations, Slovenian foreign policy is now viewing its active involvement in 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as its second priority within the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union. The Government 
sees the accession to the Barcelona process as a means to strengthen Slove-
nian Mediterranean identity, etc.
25  
 
24 This statement should be taken with a caveat. Slovenia’s own primary self-
perception is that of being a Central European country and the Mediterranean iden-
tity comes second to that. This self-perception is mirrored in the academic literature 
on the EMP, where Slovenia is not always counted among the Mediterranean new 
member states. Thus Khader (2003) and Prosperini (2003) in their analysis of the 
impact of enlargement on the EMP and MNMCs do not consider Slovenia as a 
Mediterranean country but exclusively as a Central (and Eastern) European country. 
Tovias (2001), on the other hand, counts Slovenia among the Mediterranean coun-
tries. 
25  See, e.g., Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel’s speech delivered at the Summit of Fran-
cophone in Beirut, 18 October 2002, 
(http://www.gov.si/mzz/govori/02101801.html.) It should be noted, however, that 
views of Slovenian political parties do not seem to always coincide with this orien-
tation. In a recent study conducted by the authors, it was only one political party 
(Social Democrats of Slovenia), which included the EMP on its list of several CFSP 
priorities of Slovenia. 
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On the more practical note, the Slovenian foreign ministry is in the process 
of reorganisation and the early experience of taking part in the EMP as an 
observer since the signing of the Treaty of Accession
26 has already had an 
influence on the organisation of the tasks related to the MNMCs in the 
Ministry. The conduct of relations with the MNMCs is being moved from 
the Sector for bilateral relations to the European sector and the Sector for 
development aid.
27  
The picture of economic links between Slovenia and Mediterranean indi-
cates, however, that this is the area where much ground still needs to be 
covered. The links that were established in the Yugoslav times have only 
been maintained but not deepened in the first years of independence, and 
new economic ties are being built only very slowly.
28 Trade statistics show 
a very modest trade exchange between Slovenia and the MNMCs. In 2002, 
Slovenian trade with the MNMCs amounted to only 116 million USD 
(Ministry of Economy 2003a: 2), while its total trade with the countries of 
the EU in 2000 amounted to 14,4 billions Euro (Eurostat 2001: 2). There 
are no FDI flows between Slovenia and the MNMCs (Ministry of Economy 
2003a: 3). However, similar to the foreign policy reorientation, the explora-
tion of the economic opportunities in the Mediterranean is currently under 
consideration.
29 These efforts are all still in the very nascent stages, but 
 
26  Signed in Athens on 16 April 2003. 
27  Authors’ interview with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
28  The record of agreements on economic, trade and investment co-operation clearly 
confirms this standpoint. The agreements on economic cooperation with Algeria, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Tunis, and Morocco have been succeeded from the agreements 
between Yugoslavia and these countries in the 1970s. Recently new agreements, in-
cluding trade arrangements and protection of investment have been signed or are 
under negotiations with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta (Minis-
try of Economy 2003b). 
29  For example, the Ministry of Economy takes an active part at informal ministerial 
meetings and at working groups within the EMP. The analyses of the possibilities of 
active involvement of Slovenian enterprises in projects funded by the MEDA pro-
grammes are conducted. The Slovenian Chamber of Industry and Commerce organ-
ises study visit to Egypt and Turkey to explore the business opportunities.  
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they do point to something which may be termed “reverse impact” It is not 
only the impact enlargement has on the EMP that needs to be considered 
when the future of the EMP is under question. The rough outline of the 
changes in Slovenian foreign policy and of the undertakings of its eco-
nomic policy and business strategies suggests that the EMP has an impact 
on the acceding states as well.  
Conclusion 
The mapping of the impact of enlargement on the relations between the EU 
and the MNMCs in general and on the EMP in particular shows that the 
impact takes different turns and, consequently, that it goes beyond the po-
litical realist view of balancing the EU’s relations with its neighbours to the 
east and to the south. Furthermore, it cannot be simply assessed by looking 
at the flows of financial aid and structural funds designed to CEECs and the 
MNMCs. Assessing the impact and drawing conclusions as well as making 
assumptions on the future of the Union’s relations towards the countries 
east of the new member states and the MNMCs needs to include various 
levels of analysis, which take global, European, Mediterranean and mem-
ber states’ perspectives. Only by such holistic approach, as it were, i.e. con-
sidering all these levels as a single whole, appropriate strategies for the fu-
ture of the EMP can be shaped.  
The presentation of the Slovenian efforts in relation to the newly discov-
ered options for economic and political engagement in the MNMCs sug-
gests that following the actual accession of the new member states the 
Mediterranean region will not be exposed to neglect by at least some of the 
new member states. Obviously, the case of Slovenia makes but a small 
piece in the jigsaw; comparative studies of the efforts undertaken in rela-
tion to the EMP and the MNMCs in the new member states will be war-
ranted with a view to understand their expectations in terms of their en-
gagement in the EMP after 2004.  
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Under Full Sail in a Millennium of Migra-
tion? Enlargement in the East and 
“Push and Pull Factors” in the South 
The Mediterranean has always been the area for economic, social, and hu-
man exchange between the states of the northern and the southern Mediter-
ranean countries. Conquest, colonialism, trade, and last but not least migra-
tion, have shaped relations between its northern and southern shores. Fo-
cussing on the enlargement process towards the East of Europe, the Euro-
pean Union got the growing demographic problem and the readiness of the 
people to leave their home-countries out of sight. However, alongside with 
the enhanced endeavours of the European Union to intensify and reformu-
late short-term commercial ties with North Africa, the Levant, and Turkey 
through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), illegal immigration 
gained importance as an area of research. Economic and security implica-
tions on both sides of the Mediterranean are coming to the fore. Reasons 
for southern emigration are manifold and obvious. A biblical saying goes 
“in case the prophet does not come to the mountain, the mountain will 
come to the prophet.” Same applies to migration. If prosperity does not 
come to the people, the people will come to the places of prosperity.  
Migration in Figures 
The deteriorating socio-economic situation and the linked risk of distribu-
tional conflicts between the states in the South Mediterranean are the rea-
sons why the European Council in June 1992, during the Lisbon summit, 
for the first time classified the Mediterranean region as significant strategi-
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cally important.
1 Future and present scenarios provided by the European 
Union deal with the problem of uncontrolled south-north migration, of 
which the EU has always been afraid of.
2 In addition to the differences in 
terms of economic figures between the member states of the European Un-
ion and the Mediterranean partner countries (MPCs), the demographic dif-
ference between the North and the South inevitably attracts growing atten-
tion. In unison, the arab MPCs population growth of up to 3 percent was 
estimated as an essential element of the heterogeneous prosperity between 
the EU and its southern neighbour region on the other side of the coast. It is 
conspicuous that over the past decade net migration to the EU has been ex-
tensive. After reaching its peak of over 1 Million per annum in the early 
1990’s, net migration to the EU declined over the past decade, however, 
rising back up to 700,000 in 1999 again. The net legal immigration rate for 
the EU during 1990-98, was at 2.2 per 1000 inhabitants, compared to 3 for 
the United States and almost 0 for Japan. It is estimated, that illegal immi-
gration in Europe is 60 percent higher, at about 500,000 per annum, than in 
the United States. The population of the European Union is 34 percent lar-
ger than the US population. Refugees seeking asylum in the EU between 
1989 and 1998 have also exceeded an average of 350,000 per annum. 
About 20 percent of the applicants are accepted.
3 The figures of foreigners 
of a typical EU country have steadily increased as a result of substantial net 
migration flows. In Germany for example, this figure grew by about 3 mil-
lion to 7.3 million between 1985 and 1999. The percentage of the popula-
tion with foreign nationalities in the countries of the EU is 8.9 percent in 
 
1  Hereunto the European Parliament figured already in 1991 out, that “... the pressure 
of migration will be all the more massive and uncontrollable if the European Com-
munity does not establish new and more equitable trade relations with the Mediter-
ranean third parties, and does not institute cooperation that is quantitatively differ-
ent from that of the past in order to contribute to the development and growth of 
these countries.” (Resolution A3-121/91 on a renewed Mediterranean Policy Con-
sideration 1, European Parliament). 
2  The legislation of alien law from all EU-member states can be found on: http://194. 
235.129.80/euromesco/seccao_geral.asp?cod_seccao=5034. 
3  Herbert Brücker et al. (eds.): Managing Migration in the European Welfare State, 
Berlin, June 2001, p. 1. 
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Germany, 9.1 percent in Austria, 8.7 percent in Belgium, 6.3 percent in 
France, 2.1 percent in Italy and 3.8 percent in the UK.  
 
Figure I. Migration rates of the EU-15 and selected EU countries, 1988-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Sopemi (2000) and Eurostat (2000) 
Three Phases of Migration 
Post-war migration in Europe can be divided into three phases: the first 
phase beginning with the period of foreign worker recruitment after World 
War II and ending during the first oil price crisis in 1973/74. The second 
phase starting in the mid 1970s until the 1980s, and the third taking place at 
the end of bipolarity and the following collapse of socialism in 1989. Deal-
ing with the third wave of migration, forecasts on demographic trends out-
line the following scenario: The arab MPCs population will rise from 
167,43 million in the year 2000 to 204,88 million until 2010. An UNDP 
study forecasts a rise to 250,47 Million people, based on an annual growth 
rate of 1.7375 percent until the year 2020.
4  
 
4  More details are presented in Figure II (demographic trends).  
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Roberto Aliboni’s interpretation of this forecast estimates that the actual 
number of 9 million people, who are currently unemployed in the region, 
will rise up to 15 million within the next years if the arab MPCs fail to re-
constitute their economic growth. This aspect could contribute to a distinct 
migration exodus, with the EU most likely being the main destination.
5 An 
asymmetric forthcoming free trade zone will most likely enforce these de-
velopments, which would automatically broaden the gap between South 
and North irreversible. Although liberal trade-relations are beneficial by 
matter of principle and have the potential to establish economic structures 
which enable the people to stay in their respective home-countries, a one-
sided liberation with asymmetric tariffs would bring about the contrary. 
Sub regional instabilities, marginalization and an euro-med collapse would 
be the outcome. All this is not unknown. Arnold Hottinger described the 
enormous gap of prosperity between the two Mediterranean shore sides 
five years ago:  
“The 226 million people of the eleven South Mediterranean States gained 
in 1996 a very unequally distributed income per head of 2336 US-Dollar, in 
contrast the 176 million people of the five States of the North gained an 
average of 20,777 US-Dollar. This represents approximately nine times 
more. At the same time the population of the South grew between 1990 and 
1996 for 2.5 percent each year while the population of the North stagnated 
at 0.3 percent.”
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  Roberto Aliboni: Südmediterrane Herausforderungen. Antworten der EU-Staaten 
sind gefragt, in: Internationale Politik, No. 2, Bonn 1996, p. 11. 
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Figure II. Demographic trends and future scenarios in the Mediterranean 
  
Pop. in    
million 
Pop. in     
million 
Pop. in      
million 
Pop. in 
million 
Pop. in 
million 
STATE  HDI (2002)  1975 1997 2000 2010 2020 
         
Algeria  0,68 16  28,9  30,31  36,21  43,18 
Egypt  0,62 38,8  60,7  67,89  83,53  102,46 
Jordan  0,72 1,9  4,8  4,91  6,6  8,73 
Lebanon  0,74 2,8  3,4  3,5  4,01  4,76 
Libya  0,76 2,4  5,2  5,29  6,51  8,36 
Morocco  0,59 17,3  28,8  29,88  36,36  43,49 
Syria  0,66 7,4  15,6  16,19  20,81  27,11 
Tunisia  0,7 5,7  9,3  9,46  10,85  12,38 
Region   92,3 156,7  167,43  204,88  250,47 
Data is established from: United Nations Development Programme (ed.): Human Devel-
opment Report 2001, Oxford 2001, 154; United Nations Development Programme (ed.): 
Arab Human Development Report 2002, New York, 144.
A Double Challenge 
Having above figures in mind, the demographical situation is a double 
challenge. Firstly, there is a very large young population on the one hand 
and an emergent elderly population on the other hand and, secondly, the 
population proportion of the two coasts shores has changed during the last 
half of the century. In the 1950s 68 percent of the population lived in the 
northern and 32 percent in southern states of the Mediterranean. This trend 
has changed intensely. Already in the 1990s the population relation shifted 
from 42 percent to 58 percent. Prognoses for the year 2010 estimate a pro-
portion of 34 percent to 66 percent. Boustani and Fargues describe the fu-
ture scenario for the year 2025 as follows: “Of the 170 million additional 
people living on the shores of the Mediterranean in 2025, 68 percent will 
have been born in an Arab country, 22 percent in Turkey, and only 10 per-
 
6  Vgl. Arnold Hottinger: Arabic suffering and passions, in: NZZ Folio, Das Mittel-
meer, No. 6, 1998, p. 41. 
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cent in Europe.”
7 More food, water and jobs are needed in order to handle 
such a population growth thus preventing social crisis. The chart below 
gives a differentiated overview about the MPCs annual demographic in-
crease. Consequently, it can be said that after the East-West conflict a gen-
eral paradigm change has taken place: from the security dilemma to the 
survival dilemma. In developing countries the survival dilemma derives 
from uncontrolled population growth and regional impacts of the global 
change of the climate.
8 This has implications with regard to urbanization, 
soil erosion, desertification, cumulative water deficiency and comestible 
goods as well as environmental pollution. When the “century of refugees” 
turned into the “century of migration” Peter Opitz realized that currently 
the number of economic refugees easily transcends the number of political 
refugees but the number of environmental refugees could top the number of 
economic refugees soon.
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure III. MPCs annual demographic increase 
 
Annual Growth rate     
 2000  1975-1999  1999-2015 
Algeria   1,82 percent  2.6 percent  1.5 percent 
Egypt   1.82 percent  2.3 percent  1.5 percent 
Jordan   2.9 percent  3.8 percent  2.5 percent 
Lebanon   1.97 percent  0.9 percent  1.3 percent 
Libya   2.13 percent  3.1 percent  1.9 percent 
Morocco   1.87 percent  2.2 percent  1.6 percent 
Syria   2.59 percent  3.1 percent  2.4 percent 
Tunisia   1.12 percent  2.1 percent  1.2 percent 
 
Source: United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report 2001, Ox-
ford 2001, 154-156. 
 
7  Rafic Boustani and Philippe Fargues: Atlas du Monde Arabe: Geopolitique et So-
cieté, Paris, p. 39. 
8  Michael Renner: Fighting for Survival. Environmental decline, social conflict and 
the new age of insecurity, London 1997, p. 198. 
9  Peter J. Opitz: Migration/Weltflüchtlingsproblematik, in: Wichard Woyke: Hand-
wörterbuch Internationale Politik, Bonn 1998, p. 252. 
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Enlargement in the East and “Push and Pull Factors” in 
the South 
Migration studies distinguish between “push and pull factors” of migration. 
Civil wars, military conflicts, terrorism and grinding poverty do belong to 
the push factors. The aspiration and hope for better living conditions, free-
dom and security are defined as the so called pull factors.
10 As a conse-
quence, an intense migration pressure lies on the EU and its member states. 
The essential push factors are: the extreme population growth of the South 
with all sorts of social problems entailed, controlled economies whose 
gains passes off the average population and enriches a small elite as well as 
asymmetric trade relationships and, thirdly, an emerging factor in future: 
environmental pollution.
11 Also the search for jobs and the refugees’ hope 
for a better future
12 boost the flow of migration to Europe. Moreover, the 
impact of enlargement of the EU on the Barcelona process will be intense. 
Several questions come into one’s mind: What does the integration of 10 
new eastern member states (NMS) mean for the cooperation strategy with 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)? What comes afterwards? What 
does it mean for the Euro-Mediterranean-Partnership? 
The current 15 member states of the EU, the 10 NMS, the remaining three 
candidate countries (CC) and the Mediterranean partner countries of the 
EU, are being gradually integrated into a large Free Trade Zone (FTZ), 
which will cover 37 countries altogether in 2010. This FTZ will be the big-
gest free trade area worldwide by far. The combined population is about 
710 million people. In the year 2000, for example, its combined average 
GDP per capita is 15,652 US-Dollar and the joint GDP amounted to ap-
 
10  Reginald T. Appleyard: Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries, in: Interna-
tional Migration, Vol. 33, 3-4, 1995, p. 293-311; Peter J Opitz: Welten im Um-
bruch, Menschen im Aufbruch. Das Weltflüchtlingsproblem, in: Opitz, Peter J. 
(ed.): Weltprobleme, Bonn 1995, p. 151. 
11 Franz Nuscheler: „Neue Völkerwanderungen“ aus dem Süden: Bedrohung oder 
Halluzination, in: Jahrbuch Dritte Welt 1999, München 1998, p. 27. 
12  Out of seven world regions, the Arab countries had the lowest freedom score in the 
late 1990s, UNDP: AHDR 2002, p. 27. 
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proximately 11.1 trillion US-Dollar purchasing power parity.
13 As a result 
of the Copenhagen summit 2002, the status of 10 countries changed (Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia). The EU decided to admit these NMS by 
May 2004. Furthermore, Romania and Bulgaria are already welcomed as 
member states in 2007. If Turkey fulfils the political criteria of the EU by 
end of 2004, Brussels will start accession negotiations with Ankara, too. 
These fundamental shifts in the configuration of the EU will most probably 
have spill over effects for the entire area of the free trade zone, too.  
Most of the tariff barriers will be removed and market size increases. This 
induces implications to trade and investment. In addition, there are so 
called indirect effects.
14 The spill over effects may also trigger economic 
belongings throughout the FTZ. Moreover, the accession of Cyprus and 
Malta will have an external as well as an internal dimension. Firstly, the 
borders of the European Union are extended southwards. This already 
makes Europe more Mediterranean. Moreover, it strengthens the Mediter-
ranean group within the EU (Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and Greece). 
There will be seven Mediterranean member states afterwards.  
However, economic difficulties appear to be already determined.
15 In 2004, 
the 10 NMS will increase the population of the EU by approximately 20 
percent while GDP will only be enhanced by 4 percent, This means that 
GDP per capita in the EU more than doubles the GDP in the NMS. The 
rigorous tendency of some member states of the EU to subordinate Euro-
Med political long-term multilateral goals to unilateral short-term trading 
interests could be described as an economic boomerang. Uneducated la-
bour, not finding employment in its home-countries will not qualify to the 
 
13  The source of all calculations is the World Bank’s Development Report 2002. 
14  Indirect effects are, for example, increased competition in markets, fundamental 
changes in economic policies and, last but not least, all sorts of alterations regarding 
institutions and legal systems. 
15  The GDP of the EU population (376.4 Mio.) have an amount of 7,8 trillion US-
Dollar, the GDP of the 10 NMS population (75.1 Mio.) have an amount of 327 mil-
lion US-Dollar, the GDP of the MPS population (164 Mio.) have an amount of 357 
million US-Dollar. 
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sophisticated needs of European employers and will increase the problems 
of the European social welfare systems. A decade ago, a World Bank report 
already documented: “Unemployment is a serious economic, social and 
political phenomenon throughout the region. More than 15 percent of the 
active population is unemployed in the countries of the Maghreb, Egypt, 
and in Iran, while in Jordan and in Yemen the unemployment rates exceed 
25 percent. The consequences of past demographic growth will continue to 
show up as extraordinary increases in the working age population during 
the next 20 years. If the region is to find social stability thanks to the pro-
ductive employment of those currently unemployed and of the work force 
that will enter the labour market in the future, the rhythm and the nature of 
economic growth must develop considerably compared to what they have 
been in the recent past.“
16 
From the illegal immigrants’ perspective, Europe is, of course, still very 
attractive. As Joffé pointed out: “No wonder that migration seems an 
attractive option, despite European xenophobia and official 
discrimination.”
17
 Some arab MPCs support this movement. For them the 
control of illegal migration towards Europe mutated from a punishable act 
to a booming business.
18 At the same time, xenophobia among the 
European population increases. The starting illegal south-north 
immigration is watched with fear. Scientists have already noted that in 
many ambiences at northern shores of the Mediterranean xenophobic 
attitudes exist even though not frankly spoken out.
19 In Spain for example, 
where only every third illegal immigrant gets caught, Moroccans, who try 
to reach the northern shore in their wooden rowing boats in cover of the 
 
16  World Bank (ed.): Annual Report 1992, Washington 1992, p. 58. 
17  George Joffé: Europe and the Mediterranean, London 2000, p. 3. 
18  Ali Bensaad: Durch die Wüste – Reise ans Ende der Angst, in: Le Monde diplo-
matique, September 2001, p. 18 and Michael Pugh: Europe’s boat people: Maritime 
cooperation in the Mediterranean, Institute for Security studies of WEU, Chaillot 
Paper 41, Paris 2000. www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai41e.html 
19  Vgl. Nadji Safir: The Question of Migration, in: Holmes, John W. (ed.). Maelstrom, 
Cambridge 1995, p. 68. 
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wooden rowing boats in cover of the night, are named “Moros”, “Tunas” or 
“espaldas mojadas” (wet backs).
20  
Exaggerated comparisons state that “... the twenty-first century could once 
again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not as 
armies. Indeed, massive Islamic immigration into France may already have 
reversed Charles Martels victory in 732 at the Battle of Tours.“
21 However, 
the nucleus of such comparisons can be taken seriously and indicates a se-
rious problem with regard to European security interests. Because of this 
chain – from immigrant, to terrorist and, ultimately, to a soldier of a hostile 
army – the political and economic stability of all arab MPCs, bilateral or in 
the framework of the EMP, should thus be in the own security interest of 
the EU. Inter alia this is due to the fact that, “... a declining North Africa 
would be a recipe for the rise of Islamist regimes and a major exodus of 
economic migrants and political refugees to Europe.“
22 
A fair Euro-Med free trade zone, which would mean a substantial change in 
comparison to the present status quo of the arab MPCs, should become 
true. But the pursuit of asymmetric short-term trading interests of some EU 
member states should not be tolerated by the EU any longer. On the con-
trary, the framework of an equal playing field for trade and the beginning 
of a true liberalisation should be established. Otherwise, the arab MPCs 
would be hit by tough competition of FTZ with which they cannot cope in 
their current conditions. In terms of migration, this would contribute to the 
kindling of a demographic bomb. However, a temporary brain-drain
23 
 
20  Fredy Gsteiger and Christian Wernicke: Der große Graben, in: Die Zeit from 24
th 
November 1995 and Walter Haubrich: In El Ejido rächen sich die früheren Landar-
beiter, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 19th February 2000, p. 6.  
21  William S. Lind: Defending Western Culture, in: Foreign Policy, No. 84, Fall 1991, 
45. The same line of argumentation is found by Samuel P. Huntington: The Clash of 
Civilizations?, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 22-49. 
22  Richard Gillespie: Introduction: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative, in: 
Gillespie, Richard (ed.): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Eco-
nomic Perspectives, London 1997, p. 1. 
23  The first brain-drain debate came up in the late 70s; Jagdish N. Bhagwati: Interna-
tional Migration of the Highly Skilled: Economic Ethics and Taxes, in: Third World 
Quarterly, 3/1979, pp. 57-71.  
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could be measured as a fair strategy for the solution. The immigrants could 
push the knowledge transfer to their countries. Hence, from this point of 
view, a brain drain could be turned into a brain gain. Therefore Arab gov-
ernments should engage highly qualified expatriate Arabs in domestic re-
search & development programmes, instead of purely focusing on repatria-
tion efforts. For all these purposes, a successful labour migration could be 
arranged in partnership with the EU. 
In conclusion, due to the influence of immigrants, the Mediterranean is al-
ready everywhere in Europe.
24 Although the actual enlargement process 
draws off the attraction of the long-term problems such as migration and 
demographic proportion, the South cannot be ignored any longer. There 
will be a life after integration. Multilateral long-term strategies are benefi-
cial for all players. It should be made clear in fact that those member states, 
whose prefer to preserve domestic industries by protectionism and asym-
metric tariff barriers and thus lobbying short-term interests, ignore that 
problems are getting bigger, not smaller in the future. Helping the Mediter-
ranean partner countries in economic and infrastructural terms
25 and equal-
ling the common playing-field step-by-step means to give them a stable 
assistance, which is the basis for economic welfare and political stability. 
Such an initiative would have potential to reduce migration on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, would export prosperity towards the southern Medi-
terranean. Concerning the old biblical saying from the outset, it is the 
European task to move the mountain earlier than the prophet decides to 
come. 
 
24  This point of view is shared by Volker Perthes: Germany Gradually Becoming a 
Mediterranean State, Euromesco Paper 1, February 1998. 
25  Especially a scientific assistance to build up an Arab Knowledge Society is needed. 
See: UNDP (ed.): Arab Human Development Report 2003.  
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Ian O. Lesser 
Impact of the Iraq War on Mediterranean 
Security and Dialogue 
The Mediterranean has been heavily affected by the war in Iraq and its af-
termath – an extension of changes set in motion by the events of September 
11
th 2001, and continuing to unfold. Many of the most pressing security 
challenges across the region, and the leading impediments to north-south 
dialogue, pre-date this recent experience, and have been part of the strate-
gic environment for at least a decade, if not longer. In this sense, recent cri-
ses – from September 11
th to Afghanistan, Iraq and the deterioration of Is-
raeli-Palestinian relations – have simply reinforced pre-existing problems. 
The following analysis offers some observations on the current Mediterra-
nean security environment and processes of Mediterranean dialogue in light 
of recent events, from three perspectives – European, southern Mediterra-
nean, and American – with an emphasis on the latter. 
Europe – A Heightened Sense of Risk and Independ-
ence 
Events of the past few years have underscored Europe’s exposure to secu-
rity problems emanating from the south. Different constituencies have fo-
cused on different challenges, from terrorism and the growing lethality and 
reach of weapons of mass destruction at one end of the spectrum, to per-
ceived threats to social cohesion and identity flowing from migration, at the 
other. In the middle of this spectrum are a series of trans-national – really 
trans-regional – policy challenges, including cross-border crime, trafficking 
in people, and the drug trade, all with a prominent Mediterranean dimen-
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sion. The net effect, has been a growing sense that Europe’s new security 
challenges, both hard and soft, will emanate from the southern periphery, 
especially North Africa and the Levant. 
This heightened sense of risk has been accompanied by mounting European 
frustration regarding the EU’s lack of capacity, both political and practical, 
for projecting power in a concerted manner on the periphery of the conti-
nent. That said, and even with the slow development of a common foreign 
and security policy, Europe’s will and capacity to act are already sufficient 
for European power to be a factor in the geopolitics of the Balkans, North 
Africa and even the Levant. These are places where European interests are 
clearly engaged and where European actors, including southern European 
states, are capable of effective intervention. This has already been demon-
strated convincingly in Southeastern Europe. American complaints about 
Europe’s limited capability for power projection are certainly valid with 
regard to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. They are less accurate with 
regard to the Mediterranean, Europe’s “near abroad”. Aspects of the “So-
lana draft” – the European strategy document – are not so far removed from 
the Bush Administration’s declared national security strategy, with its em-
phasis on preventive action and environment shaping. The first and most 
likely theater for this strategy to be employed is, of course, around the 
Mediterranean, where Europe is capable of taking the lead in crisis preven-
tion and management. 
Similarly, the tone and substance of the EU’s new strategy toward 
neighbors to the south and east – those outside the prospective wave of 
enlargement – is not dramatically different from the approach emanating 
from Washington in the post-Iraq environment. European observers have 
been strongly critical of “neo-conservative” arguments regarding political 
and economic change in the Middle East, and the notion of “shaking things 
up” across the troubled region from Morocco to Pakistan. On reflection, 
however, are the new European arguments regarding conditionality in rela-
tions with the southern Mediterranean countries so far removed from intel-
lectual currents in Washington? From the European perspective, much of 
the current frustration with the Barcelona process flows from the apparent 
failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to foster tangible political 
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and economic change in the south –with perceived security consequences 
for the north. As the need for a functioning security dialogue with southern 
Mediterranean partners has become more pressing – a clear product of the 
post-September 11
th, post-Iraq environment – the economic and political 
dimensions of Mediterranean dialogue that would logically precede and 
facilitate this discourse, have failed to develop as envisioned at Barcelona. 
At the same time, Europe, and especially southern Europe, has an increas-
ingly strong interest in giving new security initiatives a dialogue dimen-
sion. The current effort to design a new Euro-Mediterranean security dia-
logue to replace one that had lapsed with the WEU, is evidence of this in-
terest.  
The move to revitalize the EU’s security dialogue in the Mediterranean 
raises questions about the future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative, and 
the relationship between these processes. For some time, it has been argued 
that EU and NATO efforts in the Mediterranean were complimentary to the 
extent that NATO’s Dialogue focused on hard security matters, and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership focused on political, economic and social 
development. This apparently neat division of labor now looks less tenable. 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has become more active on “soft” secu-
rity cooperation (e.g., civil emergency management) at a time when “hard” 
security dialogue and cooperation is becoming a more prominent concern 
for the EU. In this setting, the climate for cooperation will turn to a consid-
erable extent on the overall tenor of transatlantic relations, and the ultimate 
extent of NATO’s transition to a more global security institution. Iraq, and 
its aftermath, has given these questions far greater significance than they 
have traditionally had in transatlantic policy debates. 
In a European frame, Turkey is arguably the Mediterranean actor most 
heavily affected by events in Iraq. The crisis, and the ensuing friction with 
Washington, came at a particularly challenging time for Ankara, with fi-
nancial strains and European aspirations providing a backdrop for bilateral 
diplomacy with the U.S. The inability to reach agreement on Turkish in-
volvement during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq was the product of 
misunderstandings and mismanagement on both sides. On the U.S. side, the 
request for unprecedented access to Turkish territory for the deployment of 
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a large American ground force reflected unfounded assumptions about 
Turkey’s willingness to make sovereignty compromises, and mistaken 
judgments about the weight of public opinion – which, as elsewhere in 
Europe, ran strongly against intervention. On the Turkish side, the well-
disposed but still rather inexperienced AKP government in Ankara appears 
to have mismanaged the parliamentary politics of the proposed agreement. 
In the event, the agreement failed by only a few votes in the Turkish par-
liament. 
Behind all of this, the essential factor was the profound ambivalence of di-
verse Turkish elements, including the military. This ambivalence continues 
to be reflected in Turkish policy in the Fall of 2003, with parliamentary ap-
proval for the deployment of Turkish security forces to Iraq, but a willing-
ness to forego the deployment if the Iraqi political leadership disapproves. 
In many respects, the current impasse is a favorable outcome for Ankara. 
Washington is pleased with Turkey’s willingness to assist, but Turkey may 
yet avoid becoming directly embroiled in an unstable and possibly deterio-
rating situation inside Iraq. 
Heightened Wariness in the South 
The war in Iraq has clearly reinforced longstanding uneasiness across the 
southern Mediterranean regarding Western institutions, and especially se-
curity institutions. It has had an even more pronounced, and sharply nega-
tive effect on perceptions of the U.S.
1 Developments since September 11
th 
2001, including interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and not least, the 
deterioration of Palestinian-Israeli relations, have underscored the potential 
utility of north-south dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean, but 
have also significantly complicated the prospects for cooperation outside a 
bilateral frame. The basic problem of “image” among southern Mediterra-
nean publics, but also among elites, has worsened considerably. NATO ob-
viously faces the most difficult challenge in this respect. But the EU and 
the Barcelona process are also part of this difficult equation. Although the 
 
1  As shown very clearly in polling by the Pew Research Center (2003) and others. 
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war in Iraq did not produce the kind of popular unrest in North Africa and 
the Levant that some had predicted, regimes across the region are clearly 
wary of the implications of any closer, formal association with institutions 
seen as “interventionist.” 
At the same time, and on a bilateral basis, regimes in the south are con-
cerned about renewed pressures for political reform emanating from Wash-
ington – and from Europe. Southern Mediterranean leaderships can hardly 
be comfortable with strategies aimed at “shaking things up” in the Middle 
East, with Iraq as the first step. The Iraq war has led observers across the 
region to ask “who is next” – Syria, Libya, Iran? Given the open-ended 
character of the crisis in Iraq, the short answer to this question, at least 
from an American point of view, is almost certainly that nobody is next. 
That said, the environment in the wake of September 11
th and the Iraq war 
is likely to continue to be characterized by closer Western scrutiny of 
southern Mediterranean societies, regimes and arsenals. Thus, Libya is 
unlikely to succeed in its efforts to normalize relations with Washington, 
despite the Lockerbie settlement. For the U.S., the limited advantages of 
normalization with Tripoli do not yet outweigh the political costs of 
appearing soft on a state-sponsor, even a former sponsor of terrorism. This 
is yet another area where American and European approaches are likely to 
diverge over the next few years. 
Unresolved questions regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and the mounting debate on both sides of the Atlantic regarding 
pre-war intelligence estimates, have introduced a dose of skepticism into 
the political debate over WMD. That said, it is unlikely that the WMD is-
sue, including the issue of ballistic missiles of steadily increasing, trans-
Mediterranean range, will fade from the regional security agenda. Cer-
tainly, the U.S. remains highly focused on WMD proliferation in its view 
of North Africa and the Middle East. NATO has taken-up the issue as part 
of its evolving agenda, and it is sure to be central to Europe’s own emerg-
ing foreign and security policy. In five years time, it would be surprising if 
the WMD issued has faded from the strategic agenda in the Mediterranean, 
and it is quite likely to be even more prominent as missile-armed states be-
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yond the Mediterranean itself come to play a more direct role in the secu-
rity environment along both shores of the Mediterranean. 
On the whole, the post-Iraq climate is not conducive to smooth dialogue 
between North and South in the Mediterranean. Yet, it can be argued that at 
least some southern Mediterranean partners will see advantages in the quiet 
development of enhanced ties, beyond traditional bilateral arrangements. 
Some, such as Algeria, will be keen to promote their own pressing security 
needs in the context of heightened Western attention to counter-terrorism. 
Others (Syria? Lebanon?) may wish to acquire some additional interna-
tional legitimacy and insurance in a climate of more ready and rapid inter-
vention. More active participation in Euro-Mediterranean initiatives could 
be a promising vehicle for this. If so, Iraq and its aftermath could eventu-
ally spur more effective north-south dialogue in the Mediterranean – a re-
mote but possible outcome. 
Iraq also places another question in sharp relief: To what extent are south-
ern Mediterranean perceptions of the U.S. and Europe divisible? If percep-
tions regarding the U.S. and U.S. policy continue to deteriorate, this ques-
tion could acquire considerable importance, and could influence the direc-
tion of Europe’s Mediterranean efforts. If European policymakers, and in-
terested interlocutors in the south, become convinced that close association 
with unpopular American policies is a leading impediment to dialogue, 
Mediterranean initiatives may acquire a consciously independent, even 
anti-U.S. flavor. To date, this has not been the case, despite the peripheral 
role of the U.S. in current Mediterranean projects (with the exception of 
those undertaken through NATO), and a degree of wariness about Wash-
ington’s intentions in the region. By contrast, if views of the U.S. and 
Europe remain closely tied in Southern Mediterranean perception, and if 
views regarding the “West” as a whole remain negative, Mediterranean ini-
tiatives of all kinds are likely to face difficult times, especially in the secu-
rity realm. This prospect also underscores the essential interdependence of 
European and American interests and policies in the Mediterranean. 
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Flux in American Strategy Toward the Mediterranean -- 
and the World 
The U.S. has approached the Mediterranean via a shifting balance of Euro-
pean, Middle Eastern and crisis management interests. At certain points, 
the U.S. has seen its stakes in the Mediterranean largely through a Euro-
pean security lens – the traditional NATO-centric, Cold War approach. At 
other times, notably during the first Gulf War, and again in the most recent 
war with Iraq, the Mediterranean has loomed large as a logistical ante-room 
to the Persian Gulf, and as a base for power projection beyond the Mediter-
ranean per se. Throughout, issues and crises around the Mediterranean ba-
sin – from the Western Sahara to the Arab-Israeli conflict, from Libya and 
Algeria to Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean, have occupied a remark-
able degree of attention in Washington. All three of these broad areas of 
Mediterranean interest – European, Middle Eastern and crisis management 
– and the balance among them, have been strongly influenced by events in 
Iraq. 
First, the European dimension of America’s Mediterranean engagement has 
waned in importance in light of concerns elsewhere, and as the general in-
terest in “European” security has declined. The American strategic class 
now tends to view questions of European security as essentially settled, 
with residual problems in the Balkans properly within Europe’s sphere of 
action. True, there are concerns about Russia’s evolution and geopolitical 
orientation, with the possibility that some more negative aspects of Russian 
policy, including arms and technology transfers to Iran or others, could af-
fect security on Europe’s southern periphery. But in general, the thrust of 
current American thinking is to engage Europe and European security insti-
tutions as partners in managing instability elsewhere, across the “Greater 
Middle East” including the southern Mediterranean. Here, the Iraq experi-
ence has shown several southern European countries – Portugal, Spain and 
Italy – to be particularly helpful; a reflection of political affinity at the 
leadership level, and perhaps a heightened sensitivity to WMD and terror-
ism challenges based on geography. 
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Second, the Iraq experience has reinforced the significance of the Mediter-
ranean as a pathway for power projection to adjacent regions. At the same 
time, it has underscored growing uncertainties regarding access, over-
flight, and defense cooperation generally. In the first Iraq war, some ninety 
percent of the forces and material sent to the Gulf by the coalition went 
through or over the Mediterranean. An analysis of logistical patterns for the 
second Iraq war, and the on-going operations, is likely to reveal a similar 
degree of dependence on this route, including the Suez Canal. Yet, key as-
pects of this Mediterranean line of communication, notably access to Turk-
ish territory and bases, were unavailable to the U.S. in the spring of 2003. 
The implications of this have not gone unnoticed by defense planners, and 
will no doubt reinforce existing interest in over-the-horizon strategies that 
could circumvent difficult access negotiations (but might also complicate 
political relations with countries on both sides of the Mediterranean). 
Third, the Iraq experience, indeed the experience since September 11
th, 
points to another, wider trend in American foreign and security policy, with 
potentially far-reaching consequences for the Mediterranean. The last few 
years have witnessed a progressive erosion of America’s traditional, re-
gionally-based approach to international engagement. There is less and less 
discussion of the U.S. as a “European power”, or for that matter, “standing 
interests” in the Middle East or elsewhere. These regional frames have 
been overtaken by a series of highly pragmatic engagements in pursuit of 
functional objectives, above all, counter-terrorism. In this climate, coopera-
tion is more closely – and critically – measured, differing national perspec-
tives can more easily be dismissed, and new, tactical alliances (e.g., with 
Algeria) created on short notice.  
The durability of this new functionalism in American policy is an open 
question. It is certainly possible that several years on from September 11
th 
this approach will begin to fade, and a more traditional sense of regional 
interests and commitments will reassert itself. In the meantime, this is not a 
climate that lends itself to new American engagement in the Mediterranean 
as a region. Recent American trade (MEFTA) and governance (MEPI) ini-
tiatives aimed at the Middle East are, of course, relevant to North Africa 
and the Levant. On the whole, however, they retain an emphasis on bilat-
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eral relations, with a focus on concluding a series of separate free trade 
agreements with Jordan, Morocco and others, which may ultimately add up 
to a “Middle East Free Trade Area.” This is in line with the current Ameri-
can approach to trade and development negotiations in general. Regional 
and multilateral frameworks are now clearly out of favor. Moreover, given 
the weight of Europe in the economic life of all southern Mediterranean 
states, it is difficult to describe recent American overtures, or earlier ones 
like the Casablanca economic summits and the “Eisenstadt initiative”, as 
being truly competitive with European programs, including the Barcelona 
process.  
There has certainly been a revival of American debate over challenges and 
opportunities in the “Greater Middle East” – from Morocco to the sub-
continent – a designation so broad, and embracing so many insecure places 
as to lose any regional meaning. It is, however, an eminently useful frame-
work to capture a range of related, functional challenges emanating from 
the “south.” To the extent that the Greater Middle East becomes the focus 
of increasing American and European attention in political, security and 
economic terms, it will raise important questions about the continued vi-
ability of the Mediterranean as a strategic space, as well as the utility of 
“Mediterranean” initiatives. There may even be a revival of interest in 
more global approaches to Mediterranean cooperation, along the lines of 
the CSCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) 
promoted by Italy and Spain over a decade ago; in other words, Mediterra-
nean “plus,” with a purview extending to the Gulf and perhaps beyond. In 
short, one credible future could well involve EU and NATO Mediterranean 
initiatives being overtaken by more sweeping, global approaches. Alterna-
tively, the U.S. may well articulate a more deliberate strategy for the 
Greater Middle East, while Europe chooses to retain a focus on the Medi-
terranean, where the points of engagement are more direct and European 
power, both hard and soft, can more easily be deployed. 
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Looking Ahead 
The war and ongoing crisis in Iraq have influenced the Mediterranean secu-
rity environment and the outlook for Mediterranean dialogue in profound 
and largely negative ways. More accurately, the war and its aftermath have 
complicated already difficult challenges for security and cooperation in the 
region, and have strained the transatlantic consensus that has provided the 
essential background for much of America’s Mediterranean engagement in 
recent decades. The mounting insurgency inside Iraq is both a strategic dis-
traction, and a test case for Washington and others engaged in Iraq, includ-
ing Italy, Spain and, in a different sense, Turkey.  
In the current environment, it is tempting for all sides – Europe, the U.S. 
and the Mediterranean south, to look to parochial interests and pursue in-
dependent strategies.  
In Mediterranean terms, this is likely to be a dysfunctional approach. The 
key obstacles to effective north-south dialogue and cooperation, including a 
resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, clearly cannot be achieved 
without the active participation of the U.S. And, at this point, American 
engagement in the peace process probably cannot be sustained without ac-
tive European support. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine a successful ap-
proach to development and reform in the southern Mediterranean that does 
not reflect a concerted transatlantic strategy. For the south, Europe may 
loom as a critical economic and perhaps political partner. But the leading 
security partner will remain in Washington. Moreover, as security itself has 
come to be measured in more comprehensive social and political terms on 
both sides of the Mediterranean, a neat division of political, economic and 
security roles is no longer possible. The Mediterranean security environ-
ment is increasingly, inherently interdependent. 
It is probably no exaggeration to say that Mediterranean security and Medi-
terranean dialogue have reached a critical juncture. New declaratory strate-
gies are being elaborated in Europe and Washington, and regimes in the 
southern Mediterranean are facing unprecedented scrutiny, and pressures. 
The need for a more concerted approach to Mediterranean problems has  
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arguably never been greater. But, as at other points over the last decades, 
the prospects for such an approach will turn critically on developments out-
side the Mediterranean – in Washington, Brussels, and now Baghdad. 
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L’impact de la guerre contre l’Irak sur le 
processus méditerranéen 
La question de l’espace euro-méditerranéen n’a cessé d’évoluer depuis plu-
sieurs décennies, (Méditerranée occidentale, Méditerranée orientale) depuis 
la réalisation des premiers élargissements, les définitions successives de 
zones de sécurité, le processus de Barcelone et son œuvre, les interférences 
du processus de paix au Proche-Orient, l’impact des différentes conjonc-
tures. Aujourd’hui, la dernière guerre américaine contre l’Irak ne peut être 
sans impact sur cette partie du monde. 
On a pu s’interroger à maintes reprises sur la nature, le rôle, les interactions 
et les perspectives de cet espace stratégique. Il a fini par apparaître comme 
une construction quelque peu artificielle de l’esprit, une zone sans dialec-
tique ni dynamique particulières, une hypothèse de développements et 
d’interactions devenue tout à coup peu prometteuse aussi bien pour 
l’Europe que pour les riverains du Sud. 
Vu du Sud il faut bien convenir qu’après la chute du mur de Berlin, les 
pistes de prospection stratégique sur l’espace euro-méditerranéen s’étaient 
taries au point de se réduire, au cours des dernières années surtout après la 
guerre froide, à quelques grands débats économiques, à des spéculations 
sur des problèmes de politique interne des Etats du Sud devenus quasi con-
ventionnels (démocratie, droits de l’homme, constitution, élections..), et à 
la question du terrorisme. L’essentiel sur le plan de la stratégie semblait se 
passer partout ailleurs dans le monde, plutôt que dans l’espace euro-
méditerranéen. 
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L’histoire récente à travers la guerre américaine contre l’Irak s’est chargée 
de propulser de nouveau à l’avant-scène la question de l’espace euro-
méditerranéen. Quelques niveaux au moins peuvent être sollicités: 
1. Etats-Unis d’Amérique et Union Européenne ont, dans l’ensemble, 
changé dans leurs positionnements et mouvements stratégiques, et en par-
ticulier dans leurs rapports avec l’espace euro-méditerranéen. Si elle faisait 
dés le départ partie intégrante des préoccupations constantes des construc-
teurs de l’Europe, les observateurs du Sud constatent que la construction du 
nouvel empire américain implique cet espace, aussi bien en termes sécu-
ritaires et politiques qu’en termes de zones franches. 
Interroger les projections stratégiques générales de ces deux acteurs, et dé-
terminer leur nature, leur place, leurs lignes d’évolution possible concer-
nant l’espace euro-méditerranéen, ne nous concerne que dans la mesure où 
cela nous permet de voir dans quelle mesure l’histoire récente, l’après-
guerre irakienne, lui a conféré un nouveau statut.. Et de fait on peut bien 
parler d’une revalorisation de l’espace euro-méditerranéen et du projet de 
partenariat entre ses différentes composantes au Nord comme Sud . 
La guerre de l’Irak a au moins esquissée la possibilité d’un contrepoids eu-
ropéen de taille à l’ère de la construction de l’empire, en dépit de la dose 
variable de suivisme enregistré ici ou là : même si l’on doit faire la géné-
alogie de la ligne de conduite russe, les origines et les perspectives de la 
position allemande. 
Mais la véritable interrogation est celle du rapport du Sud aux projets di-
vers de sécurité ou simplement de défense mais que l’on peut bien désor-
mais délimiter comme celui de la régulation du rapport des forces à 
l’échelle mondiale, en ce temps de renversement du statu quo et de recon-
figuration du monde . 
Ce que l’on appelle la puissance européenne fait partie des débats sur le 
pluralisme des intérêts, des pôles, des comportements, des visions 
d’ensemble, en même temps que la quête par le Sud d’un équilibre des 
pouvoirs à l’échelle internationale pour que celui qui détient le pouvoir ne 
soit pas porté à en abuser. 
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Cela est sans doute derrière la distinction de principe opéré par maintes 
parties dans le Sud entre les différents occidents et la formulation du vœu 
que l’Occident européen, bien que pluriel, bien que militairement encore en 
délibération avec lui-même, contre-balance l’Occident américain, unipo-
laire, mais déjà à l’œuvre, opérationnel, omniprésent sur le terrain. 
2. La guerre américaine contre l’Irak en 2003 alimente de nouveaux débats 
stratégiques, notamment sur les relations transatlantiques : l’antagonisme, 
l’affrontement prévaudra t-il sur l’harmonie et le travail en commun? Cul-
tures, intérêts et démarches divergents ne peuvent-ils donner que des pro-
jets différents?  
La présence américaine paraît plus forte aujourd’hui que jamais dans tous 
les conflits en cours dans la zone (Sahara, Soudan, Chypre, conflit israélo-
arabe, Irak). 
Les Etats-Unis entreprennent d’avancer divers projets sur l’arène euro-
méditerranéenne (Eisenstadt, zones de libre-échange). Est-ce un hasard si 
les stratèges néo-libéraux de Washington tentent de réinventer aujourd’hui 
un projet de Grand Moyen-Orient ? Dans tous les cas de figures, ces dif-
férents projets ne se définissent pas par rapport aux processus européens. 
Quant au Sud immédiat de l’Europe est-il suffisamment présent pour 
s’introduire dans l’intimité des relations dites transatlantiques? Est-il tout 
au plus un simple enjeu de celles-ci, ou l’un de ses objets les plus ex-
térieurs?  
3. Une multilateralisation est–elle possible? Celle-ci supposerait son accep-
tation par les Etats-Unis, mais aussi une remise en ordre de la maison Sud?  
C’est dans ce contexte qu’il faut comprendre l’ambiguïté des perceptions 
du Sud concernant des menaces et des risques, et celle des ennemis (ex-
térieurs/intérieurs) éventuels. L’ambiguïté est grande aussi des attitudes 
esquissées vis-à-vis des nouvelles configurations hégémoniques. Ce n’est 
pas un hasard si le premier souci des Etats du Sud, après avoir pris la me-
sure de la volonté américaine avant, au cours, et après la guerre, par les dis-
cours et les actes, ont commencé d’abord par intégrer cette nouvelle donne. 
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Il n’est pas inexact de dire que pour l’heure on rencontre trois types de ré-
actions: 
-  l’acceptation du monopole américain, 
-  le laisser passer, l’adoption d’un profil bas, faire le dos rond en atten-
dant des jours meilleurs, 
-  la résistance, sous des formes diverses. 
Dans les années 80, les tentatives d’élaborations stratégiques de la part des 
Etats de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée, leurs possibilités d’initiatives 
étaient importantes. Ils disposaient de marges de manœuvres constantes. Ils 
pouvaient initier des projets, introduire des contre-projets, opérer des ou-
vertures, entreprendre des actions. Aujourd’hui, les espaces se rétrécissent 
et ils semblent de moins en moins acteurs. 
4. De ce qui s’est déroulé et de ce qui se déroule toujours en Irak, quelles 
leçons tirer? Des liens semblaient bien établis entre l’essai de changement 
de régime forcé en Irak et la “road map” en Palestine au début de la guerre, 
au moins dans l’esprit des stratèges américains. Aujourd’hui elle l’est 
moins dans la réalité. Certes l’affaire irakienne ne pouvait que rejaillir sur 
le pouvoir de négociation de la rive sud dans l’ensemble des dossiers en 
instance. Le cercle vertueux formé par l’articulation de la paix, de la dé-
mocratie et de la stabilité- atteste que réformer les Etats arabes (lutter con-
tre la pauvreté, “moderniser” le système éducatif, réformer la vie poli-
tique…) serait déterminant pour la paix. Mais la non-solution des grands 
problèmes régionaux (le processus de paix israélo-arabe, l’occupation amé-
ricaine de l’Irak) ne constituent-ils pas des obstacles aux réformes. 
De grandes conflictualités enveloppent les Etats et les sociétés du Sud de la 
Méditerranée. La redécouverte de leurs multiethnicités, de leurs multicon-
fessionnalités, les aléas de leur processus d’intégration remettent en cause 
leur existence en tant que Etats et en tant que sociétés. Isolés, faibles, en 
‘’crise’’ sur divers plans, tous à majorité arabo-musulmane, structurés en 
Etats nationaux ayant des intérêts nationaux sous pression, ils ne cessent de 
produire des pathologies politiques, sociales, économiques et culturelles. 
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Quelles que soit l’hypothèse retenue, comment endiguer ces conflictualités 
qui enveloppent les Etats du Sud jusqu’à leurs racines? Comment réédifier 
le minimum d’intégration nationale nécessaire à la vie étatique nationale?  
Par ailleurs, saurait-on sous prétexte qu’il n’y a pas de modèle unique de 
transition pluraliste, que les différentes expériences de démocratisation 
connues jusque là attestent de la variété des processus – considérer comme 
recevable “management à l’americaine” de la réforme démocratique, c’est à 
dire la démocratisation imposée, exogène? 
Comment gérer l’ingérence démocratique sans annihiler à la source les 
processus internes de passage des différentes variantes des despotismes ori-
entaux aux régimes de la liberté? La démocratie une fois enclenchée, sau-
rait-elle être acceptée avec tous ses risques? Doit-on accepter des formes de 
pouvoir autres que séculaires?  
De ce qui précède on voit quel travail attend le Sud: outre les nouvelles 
postures que doivent esquisser les forces politiques, s’imposent le ren-
forcement de la communauté nationale (Etat, nation, société civile), la dé-
mocratisation en termes institutionnels et culturels, la réorganisation des 
cercles de solidarité (de nouveaux rapports avec l’organisation mondiale, 
les regroupements régionaux, l’espace euro-méditerranéen l’OTAN, les 
différents occidents…). 
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Jean-François Daguzan 
From the Mediterranean to a Greater 
Middle East: Challenges for European 
Policy Formulation 
The events of the 11th September, the second Intifada and the Iraq War 
have completely changed the conditions for co-operation in the Mediterra-
nean. It is now not possible to pretend to consider these events as minor 
incidents which do not threaten the basis of this political project.  
As noted by Christoph Zöpel: “Because of their relations with the neigh-
bouring region of the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean, the 
states of Europe are affected in a different and more immediate manner 
than the United States by both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conflict 
with Iraq. They have a more pronounced interest than the United States in 
preventing escalation and promoting the resolution of these conflicts, and 
their actions are more strongly influenced by these motives.”
1 The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership must therefore be rethought from top to bottom, 
both in its content and in its area of application. 
The Barcelona Partnership corresponded to a peace-oriented view of inter-
national relations. This view was in the context of a security dynamic asso-
ciated with the end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. In many respects, the declaration which was 
signed in Barcelona in 1995 could no longer be signed today. However, the 
political, development and security stakes which engendered the declara-
 
1  September 11 - Consequences for German Foreign Policy, in Carlo Masala (ed.) 
September 11 and The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Co-operation, ZEI Discussion 
Paper C120 2003, p.13. 
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tion are higher than ever. The situation in the Middle East only increases in 
relevance. Nonetheless, it is necessary to see how the situation has devel-
oped after two years of tragic events and whether it is possible, in spite of 
everything, to find a new approach, a reopening which also includes the 
question of the Middle East. 
Co-operation on a heap of rubble: an analysis of the ef-
fects of the crisis 
The consequences of September 11 
In many respects, September 11 represents an earthquake in international 
relations. Wounded to the core by radical Islamic terrorists of Arab origin, 
the United States certainly committed itself to an all-out anti-terrorist cam-
paign, but also combined this objective with a battle against proliferation 
which led less than a year later to the war in Iraq. The consequences of 
these political decisions weigh heavily on the Mediterranean and Middle 
East region. 
 
The “terrorisation” of international relations by the United States: 
“war against terror” 
The struggle against Islamic terrorism as defined by the United States im-
plies a world-wide organisation with which all the countries of the world 
must cooperage, either willingly or by force. The document published by 
the White House : “The National Security of the United States” in Septem-
ber 2002, is particularly explicit. Under a single heading of “war against 
terror” President George W. Bush combined terrorism and the risks of pro-
liferation. This globalisation of the real and/or presumed threat enables 
global action to be justified anywhere in the world and, notably, pre-
emptive war. In many respects the war in Iraq may be regarded as a direct 
manifestation of this doctrine. We wrote in 2002: “The war against Islamic 
terrorism is limited by the universality of its presence and the porosity of 
world society. (...) This struggle will be long and essentially shadowy. This 
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is why the “re-territorialisation” of the threat (as has been done in Afghani-
stan and then extensively, Iraq) has become indispensable to respond to the 
shock of the “defeat” of September 11.
2 
Stefano Silvestri has summed up this problem in a very illuminating way, 
in three parts: 
1. Total pre-emption (or total intervention): when the United States inter-
venes or when it desires to do so. 
2. World-wide suppression: an integrated security system is constructed. 
3. Reinforced stabilisation mission: a combination of pre-emptive and de-
fensive intervention.
3 
The states of the world, and notably the states of the Third World, have no 
other choice than to co-operate or suffer the consequences. The compensa-
tion is better economic co-operation and increased development from the 
benefits of the WTO and free trade. The democratisation of authoritarian 
states seems also to be one of the objectives, which the neo-conservatives 
(Kagan, Perle, Kristol etc.) hammered away at in the media at the time of 
the Iraqi conflict and which crops up again in the national security strategy 
already quoted. This trend carries with it its share of destabilisation, even if 
the disastrous post-war situation in Iraq does not bear out the fabulous 
hopes and dreams of the “neo-cons”.  
Suspicion in the Muslim world and the risk of confusion.  
The fact must be faced that the events of 11th September caused a change 
in the view of the Western world vis-à-vis the Arab one. The confusion be-
tween radical Islamic terrorism and Islam is a reality in some minds. Ah-
med Driss thus remarked: “A certain phobia has seized the North Mediter-
ranean; some consider that geographical proximity to North Africa and the 
 
2  This author, Ordre et Désordre Après le 11 Séptembre, Géoéconomie No. 24, Win-
ter 2002, p.50.  
3  L’Union Européenne, les Etats-Unis et le Moyen Orient; Quelques Scenarios, in 
Martin Ortega (ed.), L’Union Européenne et la Crise du Moyen Orient, Les Cahiers 
de Chaillot No. 62, July 2003, p.52. 
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Middle East, added to the fact that Europe harbours a large Muslim minor-
ity susceptible to the turmoil of this region, makes Europe more vulnerable 
to terrorist threats. It is in its own interest to affirm its solidarity with the 
anti-terrorist struggle of the United States.”
4  
But it is not sure that a pro-active position on solidarity would be sufficient 
enough to counter the anti-Muslim feeling in the North. In the United 
States, this phenomenon has taken an uncommon form with the almost di-
rect accusation of Saudi Arabia or the systematic criticism of some pressure 
groups or individuals taking the debate into the university sphere. 
The effects of the second Intifada. 
As noted recently by Alvaro de Vasconcelos: “The deterioration of the cur-
rent peace process, however, which in fact began with the assassination of 
Rabin by a Jewish extremist, and the advent of Netanyahu’s government, 
increasingly contaminated the political and security dialogue within the 
EMP.”
5 
The ostracising of Israel is now an intrinsic reality. The spiral of vio-
lence/repression/terrorism has become a feature of daily life in Israel and 
Palestine. It has also become a feature of Arab public opinion bombarded 
with images of conflict but more broadly in Europe too.
6 The (modest) rela-
tions entered into since the Oslo accords between the Arab states and Israel 
have, with the exception of Jordan, returned to their lowest level. It is 
therefore impossible at the moment to imagine any relaunching of the po-
 
4  After September 11, is there a future for the Barcelona Process?, in Carlo Masala 
(ed.) September 11 and the future of Euromediterranean Co-operation, op. cit., p. 
56. 
5  The Future of EMP Security Co-operation, in Carlo Masala (ed.) September 11 and 
the Future of Euromediterranean Co-operation, op. cit., p.45. 
6  A good example of this media pressure is the incredible result of the European 
Commission poll on the most dangerous countries for the World peace where 57 
percent of people designed Israel as the first cause of risk. See, Le Monde Novem-
ber 11 2003, Un sondage européen désigne Israël comme une « menace pour la 
paix ». 
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litical dialogue of the Barcelona process. This state of affairs paralysed the 
Marseilles conference of November 2000 and still blocks the process. 
In addition, the systematisation of the suicide attacks contributes to the de-
terioration of the Palestinian image in international public opinion. The risk 
that this strategy poses to the Palestinian cause is very serious. In fact, 
however one views the brutal Israeli military actions in Palestine, nothing 
can justify murderous suicide attacks aimed at the civilian population. The 
employment of identical methods is progressively degrading the perception 
of Palestinian claims and identifying them with those of Al Qaida. We 
therefore find ourselves facing a double breakdown: a political one on the 
one hand and a breakdown in the respective imaginations of the Moslem 
and Western worlds on the other. This crisis is now accompanied by the 
emotional shock of the Iraq War. 
The effects of the Iraq War 
The destabilisation of the Middle East. 
Bruno Tertrais has noted that “at the same time, this new defeat of an Arab 
army confronted by a Western one is likely to feed the military inferiority 
complex long felt by many of the elites of the region. It also risks provok-
ing a new ‘Gulf War effect’, that is, contributing to reinforcing the idea in 
the minds of the leaders of the regional powers that only so-called asym-
metrical or non-conventional means, such as proliferation or terrorism, can 
enable them to take on the American military hyperpower. Paradoxically, 
this war could therefore increase the threats which justified its prosecu-
tion...”.
7 
The pressure on Syria, Lebanon and Iran. 
The Iraqi question is only one facet of the new strategic situation in the 
Middle East. Its development should depend on two factors. Either the 
 
7  La chute de Babylone, in Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Annuaire 
Stratégique et Militaire 2003, Odile Jacob, Paris, p.55. 
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United States wins its bet in Iraq and the idea of a “forced” remodelling of 
the Middle East becomes a reality, or the situation continues to deteriorate 
and the local opposition forces profit from the vacuum left by America to 
spread their influence into other structurally weak countries; which is to say 
almost all of them. 
Bruno Tertrais has also remarked: “Obliged whether they like it or not to 
assume the task of nation-building in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the United 
States intends next to take on the remodelling of the region, with the first 
priority as the Israel-Lebanon-Syria zone, probably followed by the Gulf 
region, with Saudi Arabia in mind but also Iran, a future nuclear power.”
8 
But this is only one scenario. The other could be an acceleration of the de-
stabilisation of the region, which seems to be the aim of the terrorist forces 
in Iraq, and it is not certain that these are exclusively local. The Al Qaida 
dynamic seeks to base itself on a rejection of the United States in a troubled 
and unclear situation in order to gain ground by promoting degeneration 
and a war of attrition. 
A new economy in the Gulf in gestation? 
Will the arrival (and the continued presence?) of the Americans in Iraq pro-
foundly change the economic relationships of the Middle-Eastern region 
and, in so doing, world trade? It seems likely that taking control, at least 
indirectly, of Iraqi oil was not completely absent from the minds of the 
conquerors of Baghdad, although it was not necessarily determinant in tak-
ing the final decision.
9 Nowadays, Iraqi oil, with its abundant reserves, is 
an important element in the oil scene. It is not one of the key elements, 
even if the future needs of Asia, and above all, a China in headlong growth, 
 
8   ibd. 
9  See Clémentine Lemaître, La Conflictualité du Petrole au Moyen-Orient, in Jean-
François Daguzan & Pascal Lorot (eds.), Guerre et Economie, Ellipses, Paris, 2003, 
p.185-201. 
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will increase its importance.
10 The explanation must be sought much more 
in the diversification of sources (notably in respect of Saudi Arabia). 
However, the intention to apply the recipes of American liberalism to the 
Middle-Eastern region and elsewhere can be discerned in the minds of neo-
conservative analysts and think-tanks, as well as in the White House docu-
ment of September 2002. To create a large open market in the Middle East 
starting from Iraq (once re-built) thus appears to be a medium-term objec-
tive. 
This approach is not the European one. The last ten years have shown that 
pure liberalism applied without safeguards can wreak havoc including in 
allegedly stable economies (Argentina for example). The European ap-
proach, as developed first in the Partnership for Peace with Central and 
Eastern Europe, then in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, could find an 
application here; a politically credible alternative for the reconstruction of 
Iraq followed by the whole region. 
Is the EMP threatened? 
In view of this relatively bleak and generally pessimistic picture, can a 
relevant logic for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership still be defended? 
The temptation to withdraw does exist. It is pervading Europe at a time 
when economic difficulties are pressing countries to take refuge in their 
national sanctuary. Fortunately or unfortunately, such a solution is unten-
able. The Mediterranean and the Middle East influence our societies by 
their geographical proximity and by the effects of all manner of phenomena 
which they export as far as Europe (presence of a considerable Muslim 
community, the “Al Qaida effect”, the role of oil, the repercussions of the 
Arab-Israeli (non) peace process, etc.). 
From this point of view one can share in the analysis of Ambassador Amre 
Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, supporting increased 
investment by Europe in the Near East: “The European role in peace is not 
 
10  Martin Ortega, Iraq: a European Point of View. European Union Institute for Secu-
rity Studies, Occasional Papers No. 40, December 2002, p.17. 
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that of the generous onlooker, but that of one involved and threatened by 
the consequences of the deterioration of the situation in this region”.
11 The 
expectations of the Arab countries, and also of Turkey in respect of a Euro-
pean initiative in the Middle East are a reality which must imperatively be 
taken into account. To a certain extent, these countries do not wish to re-
main in a strategic embrace with the United States, with which they can 
only have an unequal and disproportionate relationship in all respects. It is 
therefore indispensable to make sure that the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship survives and, furthermore, to give it new vigour and a new reach, but 
how? 
1. The EMP must survive but its rules must evolve 
A political re-launch of the EMP cannot be envisaged while the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis remains at this level of violence and paralysis. The “po-
litical co-operation” part can only remain at the minimal level at which it 
has been since the Marseilles Conference of October 2000. However, it 
would be disastrous to halt the Barcelona Process but it is imperative to 
make it evolve in order to preserve it. As Antonio Missiroli said, the EMP 
has to be revised on “a more realistic but also more tangible prospect of 
structured partnership.”
12 Given the obstructions of all kinds which bedevil 
it today, the following alternatives and solutions can be proposed. Rather 
than adopting a defensive frame of mind a dynamic approach is suggested. 
Preserve and reinforce technical co-operation. 
The true strength of the EMP resides in the formidable network of solidar-
ity which has been established around the Mediterranean. Thousands of 
programmes are in place which structure a field of co-operation which 
touch on social and economic levels: from major infrastructure projects to 
 
11  Les Relations Euro-Arabes, Défense Nationale August-September 2002, p.50. 
12  The EU and its changing neighbourhoods: stabilization, integration and partnership, 
in Batt, Lynch, Missiroli, Ortega and Triantaphyllou, ‘Partnership and neighbours: a 
CFSP for a wider Europe’, Chaillot Papers no. 64 september 2003, p. 30. 
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micro-projects.
13 The emphasis must therefore continue to be placed on lat-
eral co-operation involving areas of major common interest (environment, 
sea, energy infrastructure, telecommunications). This approach must be 
coupled with the development of micro-projects which provide links be-
tween the societies of the two shores of the Mediterranean (women’s rights, 
human rights, urbanisation, media etc.). The modest successes of the EMP 
are due to these small programmes. The EMP is above all a collection of 
networks bringing together men, countries and the shores of the Mediterra-
nean. For several years now, the tendency of the Commission has been to 
favour large projects for administrative management facilities. The two 
poles of the Partnership must be re-balanced and the links reinforced, at a 
time when mutual suspicion is tending to grow. 
In this setting, the MEDA programme plays an invaluable role. It certainly 
helps the partner states to get their economies to conform with free-trade 
rules, but it is also an underpinning for investment, and demonstrates the 
Union’s practical determination to reinforce the insertion of the Mediterra-
nean region into the European economic system. Co-operation in develop-
ment and solidarity therefore go hand-in-hand with the adjustment to world 
standards of competition. This is a political approach, but the political di-
mension of the EMP is paralysed by the problems mentioned above. 
Political co-operation: an “à la carte” approach. 
The EMP in its indivisible form is no longer viable. If its principles are to 
survive, a way must be found to surmount the obstacles using an appropri-
ate policy. One possibility is the creation of reinforced co-operation with 
the Maghreb. Not all the players in the Mediterranean are in as difficult a 
situation as the Near East. Even though most of the countries are affected 
by the problems described above, it is possible to suggest increased co-
operation to a group of states desiring to go further together in a defined 
area, whether political or technical. On what can be termed the “oil stain” 
 
13  See Martin Ortega, A new policy for the Mediterranean?, in Batt, Lynch, Missiroli, 
Ortega and Triantaphyllou, ‘Partnership and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider 
Europe’, op. cit., p. 93. 
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principle, other countries can be brought into this initial co-operation.
14 The 
Maghreb seems today to be the part of the Mediterranean with which it 
would be possible to begin co-operation in the fields of security, anti-
terrorist action, and also social or environmental protection projects. A re-
centring might be envisaged around a new 5+5, as in the Sainte Maxime 
meeting of 9 and 10 April, which was merely a simple renewal of contacts. 
But to concentrate on the Maghreb seems insufficient in every respect in 
view of the new strategic situation in the Middle East. The relaunching of 
the EMP also involves the creation of a European initiative in the Middle 
East. 
2. The Middle East must be the object of a specific 
common initiative 
The overall destabilisation of the Middle East caused by the Iraq War could 
turn out to be totally detrimental to Europe. The countries of the Ara-
bian/Persian Gulf cannot be left in a bilateral situation with the United 
States when the conquest of Iraq has been experienced as an aggression and 
an occupation. Without exaggerating the future of the American presence 
in the country, the EU must be capable of suggesting political overtures 
which support that which must be considered clearly as a “fait accompli”. 
In this respect, the thoughts formulated by Martin Ortega in respect of Iraq 
alone can be applied to a European initiative concerning the Middle East: 
“The question now is: should there be a common European policy on Iraq? 
This question must be answered in the affirmative for two reasons. Firstly, 
the aforementioned principles - and the values and principles contained in 
the Treaty on European Union (which basically coincide with the values 
and principles enshrined in national constitutions) - cannot be defended by 
the member states alone. Defining a common policy and endorsing it 
through specific action is the only way the Europeans can be consistent 
 
14 Martin Ortega speaks about: “Sub-regional Units” (construction régionale) and 
“Diverse relationship” (relations différenciées), A new policy for the Mediterra-
nean?, in in Batt, Lynch, Missiroli, Ortega and Triantaphyllou, ‘Partnership and 
neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe’, op. cit., p. 102. 
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with their own convictions. Secondly, European citizens require that both 
their national states and the European Union define foreign policies that 
take into account common values and principles and contribute to their 
wider application.”
15 In addition, much as creating a common policy on the 
principle of cohesion is indispensable, putting the policy into action is 
equally necessary as far as influence and, simply, security is concerned. 
Europe must ensure that the shock wave of American action in Iraq does 
not produce negative effects on its own stability. 
One can therefore suggest the creation of a common strategy for the Middle 
East and connect it with the common strategy for the Mediterranean of 19 
June 2000. Their overall objectives are the same. It must involve Iraq and 
its Western neighbours (Syria, Jordan and Turkey), the Gulf states and Iran. 
Its content should touch on questions of security, non-proliferation, eco-
nomic co-operation, and also the issues of democracy, basic rights and hu-
man rights. This initiative cannot be launched without associating the 
United States with its implementation, but it could be set in motion by the 
Union alone.  
It could also allow, as suggested by Ortega, the European national foreign 
policies to be brought together. France, Belgium and Germany could re-
connect their approaches without too much difficulty with those of Italy, 
Spain and Great Britain. The cohesion lost in the crisis could then be re-
stored. Some conclusions of the European Council of Thessalonica (June 
19-20 2003) stressed on the reinforcement of relations with the Arab 
World. It’s a good idea but too close to the defunct and historically
16 dated 
“Dialogue euro-arabe”. The critical point is the security of Arab-Persian 
Gulf and the dialogue has to include Iran. On the other the Maghreb is far 
from the same difficulties and risks than the other region, despite serious 
problems (economy and Islamist terrorism). 
That being so, there is no question of absorbing the Middle East in the 
EMP. We would then face the prospect of a widened co-operation which 
 
15  Martin Ortega, Iraq: a European Point of View, European Union Institute for Secu-
rity Studies, Occasional Papers No. 40 December 2002, p.27-28.  
16  Conclusion of the Presidence, annex 1 SN 200 2003, p. 19. 
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would end up losing its direction and impact. As Eric Philippart has noted, 
“On the other hand, including Iraq in the EMP would necessitate some Eu-
romed rethinking. Keeping the Mediterranean as the main geographical 
reference would become much more difficult after the inclusion of Iraq.”
17 
This is why specific action is required in respect of the Middle East which 
would be connected to a common Mediterranean strategy and, if necessary, 
to action developed in the framework of the EMP, but it would retain its 
independent logic. Such a strategy would no longer be deleted. Some U.S. 
Think Tanks now proposed a specific action toward Middle East led by 
United States. For instance, the Nation Defense University preached for a 
NATO initiative to “create a Partnership for Cooperation (PfC) with 
Greater Middle East.”
18 EU must take the initiative immediately.  
In the same way, a common Near-Eastern strategy should be created and 
implemented, in the setting of a new “road map” project, which would en-
able the political dialogue to be advanced in a way which is not possible in 
the present framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In this way, 
projects would move forward in parallel at various speeds, which would 
enable the whole to progress much more rapidly than at present or, at least, 
not to hold up developments in particular sectors or places. 
In conclusion, in spite of the very serious current difficulties, it is possible 
to conceive of a relaunch of the processes of co-operation. The European 
Union in development cannot remain a passive observer of a strategy which 
passes it by. It must constitute its own periphery, which in the hypothesis of 
Turkey joining will certainly reach as far as the Gulf. But it must also cope 
with the security logic which is now becoming apparent to return to the 
idea of co-development and shared stability which inspired the founders of 
Barcelona. From this point of view one agrees with Ambassador Ounaïs 
who affirmed: “The concept of a partnership based on the acceptance of 
parity, forms a part of and surpasses our common history, while bearing an 
 
17 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Unique Features, First Results and Future 
Challenges, CEPS, Working Paper No.10 April 2003, p.14. 
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immense promise of understanding and solidarity. It is this promise which 
shapes our common horizon”.
19 
 
 
18  Hans Binnendjik and Richard Kugler, The Next Phase of transformation: A New 
Dual-Track Agenda for NATO, The National Defense University, Washington, Oc-
tober 2003, slide No. 3. 
19  Les Enjeux de l’Euro-Maghreb, Défense Nationale, idem p.56. 
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System-Opening and Cooperative 
Transformation of the Greater Middle 
East: Elements of a New Common 
Transatlantic Project 
A comprehensive grand Atlantic strategy for a system-opening, cooperative 
transformation of the Greater Middle East and for the inclusion of the re-
gion in the process of globalisation will have to be flexible regarding the 
scope of its approaches. It must recognise the overlapping nature of issues 
and the need for gradual advancement in the most daunting fields which 
will require patience, rigid time-frames and mechanisms of conditionality 
to commit all participants to success. The US and the EU will have to make 
up their mind whether they will approach the challenge with enabling or 
vetoing intentions among themselves. Both might have their legitimate and 
necessary place (deterrence and cooperation). But it would end in useless 
frustrations if the Atlantic partners were to quarrel more among themselves 
by using veto capacities over decision making or actions of the other in-
stead of looking together into the same direction and offering system-
opening support for those societies and countries in the Greater Middle 
East that want to be partners in the process of transformation. It is impera-
tive for the West to combine a comprehensive strategy with a pragmatic 
sense of priorities and posterities, a reality check about possible next steps 
and the appropriate combination of goals and instruments. 
The next steps and most urgent test cases for the ability of the US and the 
EU to develop a new transatlantic project are as following:  
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1. Rebuilding Iraq and returning sovereignty to the Iraqis with the goal of 
constitutional-based secular statehood, rule of law and democracy that can 
grow as part of a new development bargain among Western and Arab do-
nor countries; 
2. Constitutionalizing Afghanistan and supporting the development of a 
multi-ethnic state which will institutionalize peaceful and democratic solu-
tions to pending cleavages in the Afghan society;  
3. Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict and creating a two-state solution 
in line with the time frame of the Quartet’s „Road Map“ and generating 
long-term cooperation among the two entities; 
4. Bringing about peaceful regime change in Iran which is to say enhancing 
the domestic reforms towards an open society and the rule of law based on 
Irans full compliance with the internationally recognized non-proliferation 
mechanism for nuclear wapons; 
5. Introducing the first elements of a comprehensive CSCE-like (Helsinki-
Process) mechanism for the whole region which will include the EU and 
the US as well as Russia
1 , possibly under the umbrella of a UN mandate. 
Invasion and regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq have defined the most 
immediate challenges in the Greater Middle East, have created circum-
stances for a lasting US military presence, have brought NATO and multi-
lateralism back, and have clearly contributed to the perception in the West 
that the Greater Middle East does exist and is the most crucial challenge to 
all Western countries. While crisis management will remain focussed on 
the immediate places of unrest and while the unpredictability of develop-
ments in countries such as Iran and Saudi-Arabia remain most crucial in 
light of their potential global implication, the overall development of the 
Greater Middle East is at the long-term center of the issue. 
From the perspective of global consequences, a succesful system-opening 
and cooperative transformation of the Greater Middle East would stabilize 
the world order, it would deescalate the danger of proliferation of terrorism 
 
1  On Russia’s internal dealings with Islam see: Uwe Halbach, Rußlands Welten des 
Islam, SWP Studie S 15/April 2003 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). 
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which is also threatening various countries in the Greater Middle East. It 
would facilitate the inclusion of the Greater Middle East in the globalized 
structures of the world economy and thus critically support policies of in-
clusive development all over the region. Both in terms of geopolitics and 
geoeconomics, an inclusion of the Greater Middle East as a zone of stabil-
ity which is making optimized use of its ressources and neighbourhoods 
will become an important element towards a more stable and thus multipo-
lar world order. 
From the perspective of regional implications and bi-regional conse-
quences, a successful system-opening and cooperative transformation of 
the Greater Middle East would enhance the potential for regional coopera-
tion along the model of the European Union, of NAFTA or of the Council 
of Europe. It would leave room for sub-regional cooperation, for instance 
in the Maghreb and in the Gulf, but also in continuity with the mechanism 
of the Barcelona-Process. It would also open potential for enhanced trans-
regional and biregional cooperation, although this would lead to new ques-
tions about the role of the Western partners. The US might focus on strate-
gic cooperation along the line of NATO’s Mediterranean policies while the 
EU might favour civil cooperation along the model of the Barcelona Proc-
ess. Overlaps and conflicts of interests might arise, for instance with regard 
to the relationship of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the Barcelona Proc-
ess.
2 This is all the more of relevance for European policy makers as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council might extent cooperation and eventually integra-
tion to a rebuild Iraq and may be even to a transformed Iran.  
It will be in the interest of the European Union, to broaden its horizon and 
to develop strategies towards the Greater Middle East with a focus on con-
centric circles and specific solutions to the range of problems ahead. Sup-
porting the development of human ressources that are important for the es-
tablishment of rule of law and democracy in countries like Egypt, engaging 
Saudi-Arabia into a dialogue about a more open-minded definition of Islam 
which takes into account the parameters of the modern secular and plural-
 
2  See Bertelsmann Foundation, Center for Applied Policy Research (eds.), The EU 
and the GCC. A new partnership, Munich/Gütersloh 2002. 
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istic state, encouraging the reconciliation of Islamic interpretations of soci-
ety with secular and inclusive concepts of a pluralistic notion of the state, 
supporting the economic diversification in the Gulf economies, encourag-
ing Israel and Palestine to search for the nucleus and appropriate tools 
which will positively link their respective developments - these are but a 
few glimpses into a tall and long agenda.  
What does „concentric circles“ mean? It means an overlap of institutional 
and policy mechanisms which are strongest in a centre and remain overlap-
ping as they are stretching to the outer regions thus maintaining their spe-
cial situation and yet connecting them with the overall mechanism of policy 
cooperation. The Atlantic partnership between the US and the EU clearly 
serves as the centre piece of any successful evolution of the scheme. The 
second layer is defined by the „Barcelona-Process“ where the EU is in the 
driving position and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue where the US is in 
the driving position. The third layer will have to connect both the US and 
the EU in a more comprehensive way with the Gulf region, where both are 
pursuing bilateral (US) and biregional (EU) approaches of different priori-
ties and density. In the mid-term, Iraq will be considered to be part of the 
Gulf region. The fourth layer will have to connect both the US and the EU 
with the other parts of the Greater Middle East with Iran and Afghanistan 
as special cases, the Caucasus republics and the republics of Central Asia. 
It remains to be seen in which way Russia will be connected (or wants to be 
connected) to one or the other or to all layers of the cooperative system of 
concentric circles. Turkey is involved on the side if both the US and the EU 
through its membership in NATO and as a consequence of its status as an 
EU candidate. 
In terms of policy content, the different layers of the concentric circle of 
cooperation and partnership consist of different priorities and densities. The 
Barcelona-Process will remain defined by its civil and largely socio-
economic character. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue will remain de-
fined by its strategic and security-oriented character. Reaching out to the 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries will mean to define a common agenda 
with them which includes specific bilateral and biregional aspects (trade, 
security, energy) and links to the overall regional development (their role in 
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the implementation of a Middle East peace solution; their role in the recon-
struction and constitutionalization of Iraq and Afghanistan). Both aspects 
do likewise hold for the countries of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, 
though with a an applied arrangement in the field of economic cooperation. 
A stable Afghanistan could in the end be considered as being part of Cen-
tral Asia. A transformed Iran might be considered as a Gulf country, even-
tually even linking with the Gulf Cooperation Council. These, of course, 
are anticipated thoughts which go way beyond the current situation and 
serve only as a compass to understand the potential of the dynamics if the 
idea of a Helsinki-like process would be taken up, encompassing the whole 
of the Greater Middle East.  
As far as the Middle East peace process is concerned, a Helsinki-like „Con-
ference on Security, Cooperation and Partnership in the Greater Middle 
East“ could serve as a guarantor for the implementation of the final results 
of a Middle East peace solution, whatever they will be at the end. Thus, 
Russia’s participation in the overall project is useful and a mandate of the 
United Nations for the evolutive creation of a new regional security and 
cooperation frame will be imperative as was the case with CSCE. A „Con-
ference on Security, Cooperation and Partnership in the Greater Middle 
East“ would eventually be able to make use of the guaranteeing and ena-
bling involvement of the US and the EU (and Russia and the Gulf coun-
tries). It would encourage to continue with specifical and rather dense re-
gional schemes of cooperation such as the Barcelona-Process, with 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, and with specific dimensions of coop-
eration with Central Asia and the Caucasus. And, of course, such an overall 
regional process has to enable, support and gradually incorporate and trans-
form the very focussed activities which are necessary as long as Afghani-
stan and Iraq require external support in their stabilization and rebuilding-
phase, and as long the relationship between Israel and Palestine has not ma-
terialized on the basis of a viable two-state solution. At same ultimate stage 
of the process, these countries could become „normal“ participants of the 
overall process and overcome their current status as centres of conflict or 
post-conflict crisis management. 
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Such an ambitious scheme can only materialize and work on the basis of 
pragmatic and gradual evolution which takes into account the different lev-
els of cooperation that already exist or dominate the mutual perception. It 
seems unlikely to extent the model of the Barcelona Process to the whole 
Greater Middle East as it does not include the United States. It is insuffi-
cient to extent NATO’s Mediterranean policy to the Greater Middle East as 
it is too security-driven. It would be insufficient to define the priorities of 
the common project of system-opening and cooperative transformation of 
the Greater Middle East according to the most difficult countries where 
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are vital, such as Afghanistan 
and Iraq. It is likewise important to encourage the constitutional develop-
ments in the Gulf states, enhance the component of conditionality and 
frankness towards Saudi-Arabia, to learn from the Algerian tragedy and to 
prevent Tunisia and Egypt falling back more than their peaceful, open and 
stable development can afford.
3 It will be useful for the West to support 
Libya in returning to become a viable member of the international commu-
nity and thus a relevant regional partner. It will be important to support 
those countries of the Greater Middle East with fundamental development 
problems, such as Yemen, Sudan, some of the Central Asian and Caucasus 
republics. 
The two most crucial issues for the next two years are: a peaceful transfor-
mation of Iran and a two-state solution to the Middle East conflict. Whether 
the Atlantic partners - bilateral or as part of the Quartet which includes 
Russia and the United Nations - can achieve their goals immediately and 
 
3  In this context, it is interesting to note that Western initiatives which seem to be 
supportive of positive changes in the Arab world could easily lead to opposite re-
sults. The countries of Northern Africa, for instance, are enormously dependent 
upon import taxes on EU goods, although this practice runs counter to all European 
commitments for free trade. During the 1990s, import taxes on EU goods resulted 
in19,2 percent of all tax income of Algeria; in Morocco, the amount was 10,3 per-
cent, in Tunisia 15,9 percent and in Egypt 7.9 percent. On this aspect of the ambiva-
lence of an early free trade zone between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean 
partners, see: Jörg Wolf, Staatszerfall: Die riskante Stabilisierungsstrategie der Eu-
ropäischen Union für den südlichen Mittelmeerraum, in: Christopher Daase (ed.), 
Internationale Risikopolitik: der Umgang mit neuen Gefahren in den internationalen 
Beziehungen, Baden-Baden 2002, p. 248. 
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unequivocally will define the destiny of the idea of a long-term common 
strategic project. Failure in coordinating a peaceful and evolutive transfor-
mation in Iran and failure to bring about a sustainable two-state solution to 
the Israel-Palestine conflict will be more critical than any other pending 
problem as test case for the renewal and reorientation of the Atlantic part-
nership. One must already be more than sceptical about the realisation of 
the time-frame as outlined in the Quartet’s Road Map for a solution to the 
Middle East conflict. This does not enhance, but it rather undermines the 
Western credibility in the region. As far as Iran is concerned, the US has to 
abstain from unilateral, let alone military solutions while Europe has in-
crease the pressure through means of conditionality to give sense and teeth 
to its constructive dialogue with the Islamic regime in Tehran.
4 
While old-standing and newly emerging conflicts will dominate the daily 
agenda of policy-makers and the media, it is critical for the long-term reali-
sation of the idea of a common Atlantic project to develop the frame for a 
bi-regional mechanism with instruments comparable yet applied to the Hel-
sinki-Process which brought the Cold War to its peaceful end. Most likely 
can the Middle East conflict trigger the beginning of such a process that 
should reach out beyond the conflict-resolution between Israelis and Pales-
tinians.
5 It would be worthwhile to explore the launching of a CSCE-type 
of conference to prepare for the final stages of conflict-resolution among 
 
4  See Johannes Reissner, Europas „kritischer“ Dialog mit Iran, in: Klaus Schu-
bert/Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (eds.) Die Europäische Union als Akteur der 
Weltpolitik, Opladen 2000, pp. 173 ff.; Gawdat Bahgat, The Future of US-Iran Re-
lations, in: Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol. XXV, No.2/2002, 
pp. 68 ff. 
5  See Volker Perthes, The Advantages of Complementarity: US and European poli-
cies towards the Middle East Peace Process, in: Volker Perthes (ed.), Germany and 
the Middle East. Interests and Options, Berlin 2002, p. 53 ff.; Jerrold D. Green, La 
politique américaine et le conflit israélo-palestinien, in: Politiwue étrangère, 
No.3/2002, pp. 617 ff.; Joseph N. Yackley, Politikkoordination im Nahen Osten. 
Transatlantische Strategien zur Konfliktlösung?, in: Internationale Politik, 57, 
No.1/2002, pp. 45 ff.; Martin Ortega (ed.), The European Union and the crisis in the 
Middle East, Chaillot Papers No. 62/July 2003 (Paris: Institute for Security Stud-
ies); Muriel Asseburg, Die EU und der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten, SWP-
Studie S 28/July 2003 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). 
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Israelis and Palestinians. The presence of all relevant regional and interna-
tional actors could increase the legitimacy of the final solution, but also the 
pressure in order to bring it about. Israel and Palestine should not be just 
two neighbours living separate from each other. If the vision of a Greater 
Middle East transformed shall become reality, the two former adversaries 
will at some stage find their specific equivalent of the mechanism that 
brought about confidence, cooperation and integration between France and 
Germany. Water and energy as both being scarce and simultaneously avail-
able in abundance might play the role in the Middle East that coal and steel 
have played for France and Germany in the 1950s. 
The perspective for regional economic and social cooperation could be part 
of a larger bi-regional frame with full inclusion of the US and possibly 
Russia, supervised and legitimized by the United Nations. A Helsinki-
Process-like approach to link the Greater Middle East with the Atlantic 
partners will include procedures, mechanisms and criteria for bringing 
about various „baskets“ with the leverage for package-deal solutions that 
can be perceived as a mutual success. Security, the fight against terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, the transformation of military and militia 
forces into armies which are loyal and accountable to civil leadership; out-
lining the broad dimensions of mutually beneficial economic and techno-
logical cooperation which will include investor’s security, dealing with 
pull- and push factors for migration, the definition of minimal social stan-
dards; an increased and free encounter and cooperation among societal 
groups and non-political actors, which includes media representatives as 
well as all dimensions of religious dialogue and the search for the preserva-
tion and use of common cultural heritage 
6; common concern about the re-
alisation of sustainable human development, including training of human 
 
6  How difficult this already is in the context of the well established Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, see: Ulrike Julia Reinhardt, Civil Society Co-operation 
in the EMP: from Declarations to Practice, EuroMesCo Papers No. 15/2002 (Lis-
bon: EuroMediterranean Study Commission); about the broader context of culture 
and politics in Mediterranean governance see: Indra de Soysa/Peter Zervakis (eds.), 
Does culture matter? The relevance of culture in politics and governance in the 
Euro-Mediterranean zone, ZEI Discussion Paper C 112/2002 (Bonn: Center for 
European Integration Studies). 
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skills : these could be elements for the most relevant „baskets“ to be in-
cluded in a reshaped Helsinki-type process. The goal of this process will be 
to bring about sustainable transformation in the Greater Middle East and to 
transform the relationship between the Greater Middle East and the Atlan-
tic partners into one of cooperation and common approaches to global chal-
lenges. 
The interesting question prevails: who could and who would launch such 
an initiative? It should be in the interest of the European Union to do so. As 
far as the embodiment of the European Union ist concerned, I would pro-
pose that both the European Parliament and the European Commission 
should take the initiative; both should look for support from leading EU 
member states who could support the idea in the European Council. In June 
2004, a new European Parliament will be elected, followed by the nomina-
tion and approbation of a new European Commission. As both elections 
will follow the enlargement of the European Union to ten new member 
states, both EU institutions will have additional weight. I would strongly 
advise the European Parliament and the European Commission to prepare 
for a joint initiative for an applied version of the Helsinki process for the 
future relationship between the Greater Middle East, the European Union 
and the United States - most likely also the Russian Federation and possi-
bly under the auspices of the United Nations - for the winter 2004/2005. 
As seen from Washington or Brussels, the Greater Middle East is going to 
be the centre of strategic, political and socio-economic concern, but also of 
cultural and religious consideration for many decades to come. The region 
as a whole must be taken into consideration. This requires comprehensive 
approaches, also among foreign policy communities and academic experts 
which tend to underuse the potential for interfaces among them. Sub-
regional forms of cooperative development will have to be intensified 
without loosing the perspective for the overall picture. Promising issues 
will have to be identified which could impact on the potential for coopera-
tion inside the Greater Middle East, in a post-conflict Middle East or be-
tween the Greater Middle East and the West. The prevailing existence of 
threat potential and the dangers stemming from the export of instability to 
the West will have to be addressed with cautious realism. A transregional 
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or bi-regional frame will have to link the Atlantic partners with the coun-
tries and societies of the Greater Middle East. 
All in all, the key for success and the focus must be clear: The new transat-
lantic project must engage as many countries and societies in the Greater 
Middle East, Israel including. This will be the best recipe for lasting and 
sustainable success. This is a tall challenge for the EU and the US in light 
of a world region whose problems has divided the Atlantic partners over 
the past more than any other region in the world. Nevertheless, it has to be 
tested.
7  
 
7  On the experience of the European Union with the promotion of democracy in 
Northern Africa as part of the Barcelona-Process, see: Richard Gillespie/Richard 
Youngs (eds.), The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North 
Africa, London 2002. 
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